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Modern antitrust enforcement is premised on maximizing consumer
welfare through an examination of two variables: unit price and total output.
That inquiry suffices for static markets for relatively interchangeable goods,
but it is ill-suited for more dynamic markets. While typically associated with
technological innovation, dynamic markets can take many forms. A firm's
business model, for instance, can exhibit all the same indicia of innovation and
fluidity as the technological intricacy of its product. But by treating firms with
innovative business models as though they inhabit a separate market from their
more traditional competitors, antitrust law places those firms at a comparative
disadvantage. Rather than reward firms for the increased consumer surplus
that results from business model innovation, the enforcers of antitrust law have
instead discouraged growth in innovative sectors. The result is economically
harmful and doctrinally incoherent. This Article seeks to remedy that flaw. We
examine the unique benefits provided by business model innovators, conclude
that mergers between such firms yield underappreciated returns to consumer
surplus, and offer some recommendations for policy reform.
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Introduction
The accepted view in modern antitrust law is that a merger injunction is
warranted when the acquiring company will be able to profit unduly from the
limited availability of postmerger substitutes.' This approach raises few
problems in traditional, static markets for interchangeable goods. But in more
dynamic markets-those characterized by rapid innovation and a broad range
1. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 4, at 7 (Aug. 19,
2010) [hereinafter 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES] ("Market definition focuses solely on
demand substitution factors . . . ."), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-
2010.pdf; FTC Guide to the Antitrust Laws, FTC, http://www.ftc.gov/bc/antitrust/markets.shtm (last
visited Apr. 4, 2012); see also 2 JULIAN 0. VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE
REGULATION § 30.03 (2011) (describing the factors courts consider when determining whether an
acquisition creates a "reasonable probability" of anticompetitive consequences); Oliver Budzinski &
Isabel Ruhmer, Merger Simulation in Competition Policy: A Survey, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 277,
278 (2010) (describing "traditional structural merger analysis" as "mainly based on changes in market
shares and concentration ratios"); Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 437,
438-39 (2010) (describing how courts determine the effect of a merger on existing market power);
James Langenfeld & Gregory G. Wrobel, Upward Pricing Pressure Analysis Under the 2010 Horizontal
Merger Guidelines, ANTITRUST, Fall 2010, at 22, 22 (describing the market definition/market





of differentiated products-the usual assumptions of antitrust law become less
reliable.
Dynamic markets take many forms. Perhaps the most obvious examples
are in sectors driven by technological advancement. Yet high-technology
markets account for only a fraction of the innovations occurring in the
economy. For instance, during the second half of the 1990s-a period
renowned for technology-driven growth-retail productivity rose at an annual
rate of five percent, a development largely driven by Walmart's exploitation of
2its "supercenter" innovation. Other major retailers responded by "increasingly
position[ing] themselves in relation to supercenter retailing, some trying to
emulate it, others emphasizing what they do better or differently." 3 So profound
have Walmart's contributions to retail innovation been that one commentator
has remarked, "The iPad is cool but over the last several decades the most
important and productive firm has been Walmart."4 Innovation extends to other
arenas as well. "Fair-Trade" products have attracted an enormous customer
base worldwide among consumers who deem them ethically superior to
traditional goods. Average sales of fair-trade coffee in the United States, for
example, grew around forty-eight percent annually from 2000 to 2002.
Prior evaluations of antitrust law have discussed the effects of
6technological innovation on markets. This Article goes beyond previous
scholarship to argue that current doctrine is an inappropriate tool for evaluating
mergers in any market characterized by a high degree of creativity.
Overreliance by enforcement agencies and courts on static economic theory
risks discouraging socially desirable business model innovation.
To illustrate the phenomenon, we introduce the concept of the "business
model innovator," a firm whose business model, rather than its product, is its
2. See WILLIAM W. LEWIS, THE POWER OF PRODUCTIVITY: WEALTH, POVERTY, AND THE
THREAT TO GLOBAL STABILITY 65 (2004); see also Alex Tabarrok, Anti Chain Store Policies in India
and America, MARGINAL REVOLUTION (Dec. 19, 2011, 9:57 AM),
http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2011/12/chain-chain-chains-india-and-america.html
("When we think of growth and innovation we often think first of high-tech sectors but in the United
States during the roaring 19 9 0 s it was retail productivity growth, led by Walmart, that drove the
country.").
3. Misha Petrovic & Gary G. Hamilton, Making Global Markets: Wal-Mart and Its Suppliers,
in WAL-MART: THE FACE OF TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY CAPITALISM 107, 124 (Nelson Lichtenstein ed.,
2011).
4. TED Book Maps a New Age of Creativity and Invention: "Launching the Innovation
Renaissance ", TED BLOG (Dec. 1, 2011), http://blog.ted.com/2011/12/01/ted-book-maps-a-new-age-of-
creativity-and-invention-launching-the-innovation-renaissance (quoting Alex Tabarrok, Associate
Professor of Economics at George Mason University).
5. See GAVIN FRIDELL, FAIR TRADE COFFEE: THE PROSPECTS AND PITFALLS OF MARKET-
DRIVEN SOCIAL JUSTICE 72 (2007).
6. See, e.g., Richard J. Gilbert & Steven C. Sunshine, Incorporating Dynamic Efficiency
Concerns in Merger Analysis: The Use of Innovation Markets, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 569 (1995); Geoffrey
A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, Innovation and the Limits of Antitrust, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON.
153, 155 (2010); cf Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925 (2001)
(rejecting the idea that antitrust doctrine is ill-suited to the new economy, but arguing that enforcement
is institutionally problematic).
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chief means of creatively differentiating itself from competitor firms. We rely
in particular on FTC v. Whole Foods Market, Inc.,7 a recent case in the U.S.
Court Appeals for the D.C. Circuit that concerned a proposed merger between
Whole Foods and Wild Oats, two "premium natural and organic supermarkets"
("PNOS"). The case presents two prototypical business model innovators and
reveals the dangers of foisting traditional antitrust jurisprudence onto such
firms without accounting for their unique contributions to innovation.
We begin our discussion in Part I by presenting the controversy in Whole
Foods and identifying the theoretical disagreements underlying the decision's
three opinions. This Part lays the foundation for the analysis that follows. Part
II then provides a short account of dynamic competition theory and shows that
there is a growing recognition among commentators and regulators that
dynamic considerations should figure more prominently in antitrust doctrine.
Part III offers the basis for our theoretical analysis. In this Part, we argue that in
much the same way a subtler approach to merger enforcement makes sense for
high-technology markets, current antitrust enforcement is ill-suited to policing
mergers between business model innovators. The business model in Whole
Foods serves as our central example. Part IV explores how allowing mergers
might protect and encourage socially beneficial business model innovation
without introducing the concomitant harms to consumer welfare that antitrust
law is meant to police. Relaxing antitrust enforcement in such cases may
enhance competition, spur innovation, further efficiency, and eliminate some
perverse asymmetries that occur in the current market. We conclude in Part V
with recommendations for doctrinal reform.
I. FTC v. Whole Foods Market, Inc.
In 2008 the D.C. Circuit reversed a district court's denial of a preliminary
injunction against a merger between Whole Foods and Wild Oats.9 In arguing
that the merger would decrease the availability of substitutes in a narrow
product market, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) relied on emails that
Whole Foods's CEO, John Mackey, had sent to other Whole Foods executives
and directors, "suggesting the purpose of the merger was to eliminate a
competitor."' 0 Meanwhile, internal documents produced in the trial court
indicated that Whole Foods believed it was facing "'eroding product
differentiation' as other supermarkets continue[d] to stock many of the same
products that Whole Foods offers."" That evidence suggests that, even as
Whole Foods was eliminating a competitor in Wild Oats, it was facing
7. 548 F.3d 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
8. Id. at 1032.
9. Id. at 1032-33.
10. Id.




increasing competition from other supermarkets attempting to duplicate the
success of its innovative business model. Whole Foods thus implicates a central
quandary in antitrust law: when should a merging company be subject to
antitrust enforcement for diminishing the availability of substitutes, and when
should it be allowed to reap the profits of transforming a market by benefiting
from a merger?
A. One Court's Difficulty
The disagreement among the judges on the Whole Foods panel about how
to define the relevant market demonstrates existing doctrinal confusion about
how to deal with mergers in markets where business models are undergoing
change. The basis for the suit was section 7 of the Clayton Act, which provides
the legal basis for enjoining mergers whose effect "may be substantially to
lessen competition."l 2 The FTC and the Justice Department explain that their
goal in enforcing section 7 is to prevent mergers that are likely to enhance
market power, defined in the 2010 Guidelines as the ability to "raise price,
reduce output, diminish innovation, or otherwise harm customers as a result of
diminished competitive constraints or incentives."' 3
By a 2-1 vote, the Whole Foods panel ultimately held that the merger
implicated section 7, thus warranting a preliminary injunction, but even the
majority's opinions offered differing analyses. Judge Brown's opinion
concluded that the Whole Foods merger should be enjoined on behalf of "core"
consumers who would be harmed by a price increase because of their
"commitment" to the PNOS model. 14 This contrasts somewhat with the often-
used test for market definition laid out in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines,
which are jointly issued by the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division
and the FTC. These Guidelines focus on the likely behavior of marginal
consumers. According to the Guidelines, when defining a market, "one asks
whether a hypothetical monopolist controlling all suppliers in the proposed
market could profit from a [small but significant nontransitory increase in price
(SSNIP)]" 15  usually five percent over a two-year period.16 "If a small price
increase would drive consumers to an alternative product, then that product
must be reasonably substitutable for those in the proposed market and must
therefore be part of the market, properly defined."1 7
12. Clayton Antitrust Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006).
13. 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 1. The 2010 Guidelines
expanded the definition of"market power." See 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 0.1, 57 Fed. Reg.
41,552, 41,553 (Sept. 10, 1992) ("Market power to a seller is the ability profitably to maintain prices
above competitive levels for a significant period of time.").
14. FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
15. Id. at 1028, 1038 (citing 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552 (Sept.
10, 1992)).
16. See 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at §§ 4.1.1-.2.
17. Whole Foods, 548 F.3d at 1038.
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Judge Tatel, concurring in the judgment only, came closer to the
Guidelines approach by emphasizing product interchangeability. Although he
implied that a SSNIP analysis would be an appropriate basis for proving a
section 7 violation, he concluded that it was not necessary to satisfy the
standard for a preliminary injunction and instead invoked the looser approach
of Brown Shoe Co. v. United States. 1 8 Under Brown Shoe, the likely effect of a
price increase is only "one of a non-exhaustive list of . . . 'practical indicia' that
may be examined to determine whether a separate market exists."l'9 Judge Tatel
identified as practical indicia in Whole Foods (1) "'industry or public
recognition' of the natural and organic market 'as a separate economic entity"'
and (2) "peculiar characteristics" of PNOSs-in particular, the sale of natural
and organic goods-that distinguish them from the conventional market.2 0
Judge Kavanaugh rejected both of those approaches in his dissent. He
argued that concern for "core consumers" is an inappropriate basis for
evaluating a merger because, "for a business to exert market power as a result
of a merger, it must be able to increase prices (usually by five percent or more)
while retaining enough customers to make that price increase profitable." 21 In
other words, there is no reason to block a merger on behalf of "core"
consumers if a price increase will drive away so many marginal consumers to
available substitutes that the firm will be unable to extract monopoly profits.
Judge Kavanaugh also rejected the "practical indicia" of Brown Shoe as
doctrinally defunct and insufficiently rooted in modem economic analysis.22 He
would therefore have affirmed the district court, approving its emphasis on the
FTC's failure to present evidence that Whole Foods would be able to sustain
higher prices in the absence of Wild Oats stores.
B. Legal and Policy Significance of the Judges' Views
Judge Brown's analysis suggests that a merging company can be subject
to antitrust enforcement any time there is a group of consumers whose demand
for the product is highly inelastic. This contrasts with the view that, at least to
the extent that "lessening competition" allows a firm to raise prices and reduce
output, the primary beneficiary of section 7 is the marginal consumer: when a
merger enhances market power, thus giving a firm the ability to charge
monopoly prices, consumers who are low on the demand curve may lose their
ability to purchase the product.
Judge Tatel and Judge Kavanaugh both accepted versions of the view that
a merger injunction is warranted when the acquiring company will be able to
18. Id. at 1046 (Tatel, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962)).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1045 (quoting Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 325).
21. Id. at 1062 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).




23profit from a limited availability of postmerger substitutes. Judge
Kavanaugh's opinion, based on the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, is rooted in
microeconomic theory and premised on the assumption that markets are
24relatively static. Legal decisionmakers, in determining whether a merging
firm is likely to be able to sustain a price increase, generally assess the
availability of substitutes by surveying market data about already existing firms
without taking into account whether innovations with the capacity to eliminate
such profits are imminent or likely. The remainder of this Article considers
whether static market analysis is in fact well-suited to cases like Whole Foods.
II. Dynamic Competition Theory and Antitrust Law
This Part begins with a brief history of the law of horizontal mergers.
Next, it explains that existing doctrine is primarily concerned with preserving
static, rather than dynamic, competition. Finally, it provides an overview of the
literature that critiques merger doctrine as harmful to dynamic competition.
A. The Law of Horizontal Mergers: A Brief History
This Article addresses "horizontal" mergers, or mergers between
companies that produce one or more closely related products in the same
geographic market.25 Horizontal mergers are regulated under three federal
statutes: the Clayton Act, the Sherman Act, and the Federal Trade Commission
26Act. As noted above, section 7 of the Clayton Act, the central enforcement
vehicle,27 bans mergers and acquisitions whose "effect . .. may be substantially
to lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly." 28 Although there remains
23. See supra note I and accompanying text.
24. See, e.g., Maurice E. Stucke, Better Competition Advocacy, 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 951,
979-80 ("The federal agencies' Horizontal Merger Guidelines, like microeconomic theory generally,
assume markets are characterized by a static equilibrium. . . .").
25. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 334 (1962) (explaining that any
economic arrangement between companies performing similar functions in the production or sale of
comparable goods or services may be characterized as "horizontal"). Horizontal mergers should be
distinguished from vertical mergers, in which a company acquires a customer or supplier, and
conglomerate mergers, in which the merged companies are neither competitors nor customers and
suppliers of each other. 2 VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., supra note 1, § 30.02.
26. Id. § 29.01.
27. Id.; see also, e.g., 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § I (listing
statutory provisions that apply to horizontal mergers and focusing "[m]ost particularly" on section 7 of
the Clayton Antitrust Act); Daniel C. Fundakowski, Health Care Reform & Antitrust Enforcement: A
Cure for Health Plan Merger Market Definition Under a Post-Health Care Reform Regime, 55 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 1501, 1511 ("The primary statute on point for horizontal mergers is Section 7 of the
Clayton Act.").
28. Clayton Antitrust Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006). Section 7 was the primary basis for the
FTC's suit to enjoin the Whole Foods-Wild Oats merger: the determination of whether the merger was
likely "substantially to lessen competition" "'hinge[d]'-almost entirely-'on the proper definition of
the relevant product market."' Whole Foods, 548 F.3d at 1032, 1043 (quoting FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970
F. Supp. 1066, 1073 (D.D.C. 1997)). The Sherman Antitrust Act, which bans unreasonable restraints of
trade, monopolization, attempted monopolization, and conspiracies to monopolize, 15 U.S.C. § 7 (2006),
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doctrinal ambiguity about how to determine whether a horizontal merger is
likely "substantially to lessen competition," 29 we understand the law to have
developed in three essentially distinct stages.30
The 1962 Brown Shoe decision introduced a "functional" approach,
where market definition is considered a "necessary predicate" to evaluating a
merger.32 The Court examines "practical indicia"-such as industry or public
recognition of the submarket as a separate economic entity, the product's
peculiar characteristics and uses, unique production facilities, distinct
customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes, and specialized
vendors. 33 After defining the market, the Court identifies market-specific
factors to establish whether a merger is likely "substantially to lessen
competition." Market share is the "primary index of market power," but "a
further examination of the particular market" along with its "structure, history,
and probable future" is considered necessary determine the likely impact of a
merger.34
In a series of decisions in the 1960s,35 the Court repudiated the functional
approach of Brown Shoe and created a presumption of illegality for horizontal
mergers considered likely to (1) produce a "firm controlling an undue
can also be used to police mergers. Unlike section 7 of the Clayton Antitrust Act, however, it does not
look to probable future effects. See 2 VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., supra note 1, § 29.01. A merger that
"may" have anticompetitive effects is therefore subject to enforcement under the Clayton Antitrust Act
but not the Sherman Antitrust Act. See FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1042 (D.C. Cir.
2008); see also 2 VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., supra note 1, § 30.01 (describing the grant of enforcement
powers given to the antitrust enforcement agencies under the Clayton Antitrust Act). Finally, the Federal
Trade Commission Act proscribes "unfair methods of competition," 15 U.S.C. § 45(a), and is often used
to challenge mergers that are not reached under section 7. 2 VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., supra note 1,
§ 29.01. Both the Clayton Antitrust Act and the Sherman Antitrust Act may be enforced by the U.S.
Department of Justice's Antitrust Division, the FTC, the states' attorneys general, and private parties. Id.
Only the FTC has authority to challenge mergers and acquisitions under section 5(a) of the Federal
Trade Commission Act. Id.
29. That doctrinal ambiguity remains is evident from the differing approaches taken by the
district court and the different judges on the D.C. Circuit panel in Whole Foods.
30. See, e.g., 2 VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., supra note 1, § 30.01 (describing three distinct
doctrinal developments in determining when a merger may "substantially" lessen competition under
section 7); Andrew Chin, Note, Antitrust by Chance: A Unified Theory ofHorizontal Merger Doctrine,
106 YALE L.J. 1165, 1170 (1996) (discussing the Court's introduction of presumptive illegality after
Brown Shoe and noting that enforcement has since "evolved substantially").
31. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 321-22 (1962) (finding that Congress had
provided "no definite quantitative or qualitative tests by which enforcement agencies could gauge the
effects of a given merger to determine whether it may 'substantially' lessen competition or tend toward
monopoly," but rather had "indicated plainly that a merger had to be functionally viewed, in the context
of its particular industry"); see also 2 VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., supra note 1, § 30.01 (describing the
Brown Shoe approach as "unstructured" and "functional").
32. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 369.
33. Id. at 325.
34. Id. at 370 n.38. In Brown Shoe, the Court considered that (1) the merger would create a
strong national chain in a fragmented industry; (2) the chain's retailer would be integrated with its
manufacturer; (3) the industry at issue had a "history of tendency toward concentration"; and (4) the
defendant had failed to present mitigating factors. Id. at 344-46.
35. 2 VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., supra note 1, § 29.01 (citing Donald I. Baker & William
Blumenthal, The 1982 Guidelines and Preexisting Law, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 311, 337 (1983)).
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percentage share of the relevant market," and (2) result in "a significant
increase in the concentration of firms in that market." 36 The Court reasoned that
because the "relevant economic data" in a section 7 analysis "are both complex
and elusive," judges must necessarily "simplify the test of illegality"; and that
in doing so they should address "intense congressional concern with the trend
toward concentration" by enjoining mergers in the "absence of evidence clearly
showing that the merger is not likely to have such anticompetitive effects."
Finally, beginning in the 1970s the Court relaxed its approach by taking a
broader view of the kinds of evidence a section 7 defendant can present to rebut
the presumption of illegality. 38 That shift has been interpreted as a return to the
more flexible approach of Brown Shoe.39 But the courts' renewed willingness
to consider market-specific factors arguably has a different impact in the
modem cases because it operates in conjunction with an enforcement strategy
that involves "more sophisticated" methods of economic analysis. 40 The
Horizontal Merger Guidelines outline "analytical techniques, practices and the
enforcement policy" of the agency and are intended to "assist the courts in
developing an appropriate framework for interpreting and applying the antitrust
laws in the horizontal merger context."41 Although judges "are not bound" to
apply the tests set out in agency guidelines, many courts have endorsed or
42
applied them.
Since 1982, agencies and courts have used the "hypothetical monopolist"
test43 to define the relevant market.44 Beyond a more rigorous approach to the
threshold issue of market definition, the agencies have adopted a more
36. United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963).
37. Id.
38. 2 VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., supra note 1, § 30.01 (discussing United States v. General
Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 501 (1974), which found that historical market shares did "not
necessarily give a proper picture of a company's future ability to compete", and citing Brown Shoe for
the proposition that industry-specific factors must be taken into account); e.g., United States v. Marine
Bancorp., 418 U.S. 602 (1974); see also United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 985 (D.C.
Cir. 1990) (noting that "[i]n the wake of General Dynamics, the Supreme Court and lower courts have
found section 7 defendants to have successfully rebutted the government's prima facie case by
presenting evidence on a variety of factors other than ease of entry," and citing supportive cases).
39. See, e.g., 2 VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., supra note 1, § 30.01 (stating that General
Dynamics and Marine Bancorp have led most lower courts to follow Brown Shoe's teaching and not rely
solely on market share and concentration evidence in assessing the lawfulness of a merger, and citing
supportive cases).
40. Jay Greenfield, Beyond Herfindahl: Non-Structural Elements of Merger Analysis, 53
ANTITRUST L.J. 229, 231 (1984); Chin, supra note 30, at 1167 ("Since 1982, horizontal merger analysis
has relied heavily upon the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) ofmarket concentration.").
41. 2010 HORIzONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 1.
42. Gregory J. Werden, The 1982 Merger Guidelines and the Ascent of the Hypothetical
Monopolist Paradigm, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 253, 263-66 (2003) (discussing judicial approval of the
hypothetical monopolist test and citing cases).
43. See supra Section I.A.
44. Werden, supra note 42, at 253-54 (noting that the hypothetical monopolist paradigm
embodied in the 1982 Guidelines "gave way to widespread acceptance and application"); see also id. at
258 (explaining that after 1982 "the hypothetical monopolist paradigm ... was the lens through which
all evidence was to be viewed").
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sophisticated method of analyzing market power. Courts since 1982 have often
relied on the agencies to perform Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI)41
analysis of a merger's effect on the allocation of market power in establishing a
prima facie case 4 6 -an analysis the D.C. Circuit had approved prior to Whole
Foods.47 The use of these accepted analytical methods by the enforcement
agencies and the courts forms the basis for modem merger doctrine.
B. Horizontal Merger Guidelines
The Justice Department's Antitrust Division and the FTC issued a new set
of Guidelines in 2010. The agencies' enforcement strategy has therefore
evolved somewhat since the Whole Foods decision. Whereas the previous
Guidelines, issued in 1992, employed a five-step analysis to determine what
mergers the agencies were likely to challenge, the 2010 Guidelines emphasize
that "merger analysis does not consist of uniform application of a single
methodology," but instead requires a "fact-specific process through which the
Agencies, guided by their extensive experience, apply a range of analytical
tools." 48
Although the agencies have abandoned the "uniform" five-step analysis,
many of the considerations set forth in the 1992 Guidelines remain the same.
Under the old Guidelines, the agencies would (1) ask "whether the merger
would significantly increase concentration and result in a concentrated market";
(2) evaluate "potential adverse competitive effects" of the merger; (3)
determine whether potential entry would be "timely, likely, and sufficient" to
counteract anticompetitive effects; (4) analyze whether the merger would create
"efficiency gains" that could not reasonably be achieved by the parties through
less anticompetitive means; and (5) examine whether either party would likely
fail absent the merger and exit the market as a result.49 The "analytical tools"
provided under the 2010 Guidelines largely track that strategy.
45. See infra Section II.B.
46. See, e.g., FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 716 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("Market
concentration, or the lack thereof, is often measured by the [HHI]."); FTC v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938
F.2d 1206, 1211 n.12 (11th Cir. 1991) ("The most prominent method of measuring market concentration
is the [HHI]."). But see, e.g., Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 530 F. Supp. 315, 323 n.15 (N.D.
Ohio 1981) (mentioning but not applying the HHI), aff'd, 669 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 982 (1982); United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729, 748-49 n.38 (D. Md.
1976) (expressly rejecting the HHI). The Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index "is calculated by summing the
squares of the individual firms' market shares, and thus gives proportionately greater weight to the
larger market shares." 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 5.3.
47. See Heinz, 246 F.3d at 716; see also FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1058-
59 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (arguing that Brown Shoe "no longer guides courts'
merger analyses because it does not sufficiently account for the basic economic principles that,
according to the Supreme Court, must be considered under modem antitrust doctrine" and citing, among
other authorities, the Heinz case).
48. 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 1.




After identifying a potential competitive concern, the agencies may
engage in a market definition analysis to "illuminate[] the merger's likely
competitive effects."50 Market definition under the 2010 Guidelines "focuses
solely on demand substitution factors-that is, on customers' ability and
willingness to substitute away from one product to another in response to a
price increase or non-price change, such as a reduction in product quality or
service."5 1 This inquiry is conducted through a "hypothetical monopolist," or
SSNIP, analysis.52
Having determined the relevant market, the agencies "normally consider
measures of market shares and market concentration as part of their evaluation
of competitive effects." 53 Market concentration, considered "one useful
indicator of likely competitive effects," 54 is "often" calculated using the HHI. A
market's HHI is calculated by summing the squares of the individual firms'
market shares, thus giving proportionately greater weight to the larger market
shares. The agencies consider the postmerger level of the HI and the
56increase resulting from the merger.
The agencies may also consider "unilateral effects," or whether the
elimination of competition from the merging firms may alone constitute a
substantial lessening in competition;57 and "coordinated effects," or whether the
merger will enable collusion among firms in the relevant market.58
Finally, the agencies may consider whether the market has any
characteristics that might forestall anticompetitive effects flowing from the
merger, such as the existence of "powerful buyers" 59 who can negotiate
favorable terms with their suppliers; strong prospects of entry;60 or merger-
generated efficiencies that may "enhance competition by permitting two
ineffective competitors to form a more effective competitor, e.g., by combining
complementary assets."61
C. Static Versus Dynamic Competition
In the classical view of competition, homogeneous firms compete to offer
lower prices for a particular product until price equals marginal cost. The
Horizontal Merger Guidelines are directed mainly toward preserving such




54. Id. § 5.3.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. § 6.
58. Id. § 7.
59. Id. § 8.
60. Id. § 9.
61. Id. §10.
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competition. In considering whether a merger will create the opportunity to
institute a SSNIP, legal decisionmakers conduct a "static" market analysis in
which they review data about the existing market. For example, Judge
Kavanaugh based his opinion in Whole Foods partly on market data showing
that Whole Foods and Wild Oats stores did not have higher prices in areas
lacking conventional grocery stores, and that Whole Foods stores had not
increased prices in response to exit by Wild Oats.62
By contrast, dynamic competition occurs when firms compete not to offer
the same product at a lower price but to offer new products, processes, or-
most important for this Article-business models. Dynamic competition is
generally understood to occur in high-technology markets with modest capital
requirements, high rates of innovation, and frequent entry and exit.63 But
dynamic competition can occur, and may have legal significance, in any
market.
Evaluating the likely competitive effects of a merger along dynamic lines
can be very difficult. The ability to institute price increases after a merger, for
example, might have more to do with improvements in performance or the
addition of new offerings by the merged company than with monopolization.
The key for antitrust enforcement is to determine when a market displays
dynamic competition sufficient to warrant a different approach to enforcement.
We confront this task in Parts III and IV. In the following Section, we provide
an account of existing literature that critiques antitrust law for being
insufficiently concerned with preserving the social benefits of dynamic
competition.
D. Literature Critiquing the Doctrine
Joseph Schumpeter famously argued that dynamic competition is more
important than static competition for economic welfare. 64 Along these lines,
more recent commentators have suggested that the existing doctrinal
approaches in antitrust law may inappropriately discourage socially beneficial
dynamic competition. This Section provides a basic overview of some of these
arguments. The literature focuses on the alleged inappropriateness of applying
standard modes of analysis to evaluate business practices in innovative
markets, particularly those experiencing rapid technological innovation or those
in which a considerable amount of resources is spent on research to develop
breakthrough products.
62. FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1053-54 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
63. Posner, supra note 6, at 926.




1. Identifying Anticompetitive Behavior in Dynamic Markets
A recent paper by Geoffrey Manne and Joshua Wright of the International
Center for Law and Economics criticizes antitrust law generally for carrying
65especially high error costs in dynamic markets. The basic argument is that
antitrust economists, and in turn lawyers and judges, tend to treat novel
products or business practices as anticompetitive.66 Therefore, they are likely to
decide cases wrongly in rapidly changing dynamic markets. In United States v.
Microsoft Corp.,67 for example, the D.C. Circuit treated Microsoft's indirect
"network effect" of inducing programmers to write applications exclusively for
Windows as a barrier to entry constituting a restraint of trade under section 2 of
the Sherman Act.68 The court relied on the "highly theoretical and
mathematical" network effects literature to the exclusion of direct evidence on
monopoly power.69 The emergence of several major competitors since then
suggests that this approach was a mistake. 70 Lawrence Lessig, one of the
former special masters in the case, has asserted that he "blew it"-apparently
because he did not understand the existing potential for innovative development
in the software market.
Not only is error particularly likely in enforcement actions against
innovative companies, but the costs of error are also greater than in suits
against companies that better fit the classical static model. That phenomenon
arises because "the stakes are higher"72: innovation-particularly technological
innovation-is essential to economic growth and social welfare. Although an
antitrust suit against an innovative company may prevent abuse of market
power, an erroneous decision will deny large consumer benefits. This is true
partly because a "false positive" may have long-lasting effects: in addition to
removing the economic rewards of innovation for the target of the enforcement
action, it may serve as a negative signal to other potential innovators or cement
an economically problematic doctrinal development.73 By contrast, a "false
65. Manne & Wright, supra note 6, at 153 (drawing on Judge Easterbrook's work on error-
cost analysis); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1, 16 (1984)
("[W]e should prefer the error of tolerating questionable conduct, which imposes losses over a part of
the range of output, to the error of condemning beneficial conduct, which imposes losses over the whole
range of output."); Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696, 1696
(1986) (arguing that it is difficult to tell whether business practices are competitive or anticompetitive).
66. See Manne & Wright, supra note 6, at 167 ("Because innovation involves new products
and business practices, courts and economists' initial understanding of these practices will skew initial
likelihoods that innovation is anticompetitive and the proper subject of antitrust scrutiny.").
67. 253 F.3d 34, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
68. Manne & Wright, supra note 6, at 180.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. (citing Lawrence Lessig, I Blew It on Microsoft, WIRED MAG. (Jan. 2007),
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/1 5.01/posts.html?pg-6).
72. Id. at 167.
73. Id. ("[S]uccessfully challenging business or product innovations is likely to dampen
innovation across the economy. . . .").
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negative"-i.e., the failure to find an antitrust violation where the firm did in
fact have monopoly power-is likely to be at least partially self-correcting.74
Monopoly may attract entry or other forms of competition.
2. Mergers in High-Technology Markets
Similar claims about judicial competence have been made in the context
of merger analysis. Whereas Manne and Wright argue broadly that judges
assume anticompetitive behavior in the face of uncertainty, David Teece and
Christopher Pleatsikas contend that nonexpert judges are ill-suited to conduct
market-share analysis in the specific case of high-technology markets.
Further, because price increases after mergers in dynamic markets may reflect
changes in performance rather than consolidation of market power, the
Guidelines approach of focusing on price signals is inappropriate.76
Teece and Pleatsikas argue, first, that in projecting a firm's market power
postmerger it may be difficult for nonexpert judges to determine what products
should be viewed as substitutes (i.e., to "estimate the substitution
elasticities").77 The overcurrent protection market, for example, contains three
potential alternatives for rechargeable battery applications: PPTC devices,
bimetallics, and Smart Power with a fuse backup. Whether these products are
really substitutes for each other depends on manufacturers' requirements
regarding many performance-based factors: resistance, which affects battery
life; and failure mode, which can affect warranty costs. 7 9 High-technology
consumers require differing sets of specific electronic components and conduct
detailed analyses when deciding what products satisfy their needs. Where
products are highly differentiated, judges may focus too much on the
differences and not the similarities between the products, and thus the define
product markets too narrowly.
In addition, companies in high-technology industries compete on
performance-based factors. Price changes may therefore be an inappropriate
indicator of competitiveness, particularly in the case of "paradigm shifts"
where a merging company offers major improvements in performance or
74. Id.
75. Christopher Pleatsikas & David Teece, New Indicia for Antitrust Markets Experiencing
Rapid Innovation, in DYNAMIC COMPETITION AND PUBLIC POLICY: TECHNOLOGY, INNOVATION, AND
ANTITRUST ISSUES 95, 108 (Jerry Ellig ed., 2001).
76. Id. at 111-12.
77. Id. at 108; see also Thomas M. Jorde & David A. Teece, Introduction to ANTITRUST,
INNOVATION, AND COMPETITIVENESS 3, 7-13 (Thomas M. Jorde & David A. Teece eds., 1992) (noting
that market definition is rooted in static competition theory); Kaplow, supra note 1, at 439 (noting that
the market definition/market share paradigm is "normally employed and thought by some to be
mandatory").
78. Pleatsikas & Teece, supra note 75, at 108.




innovative product features.80 A new-generation computer chip, for example,
will be both more expensive and faster than the previous generation chip. A
merger, moreover, may be necessary to consolidate the knowledge and
expertise necessary to produce the improved product. Using a SSNIP analysis
in a market where both prices and performance specifications are changing
rapidly can be inappropriate. Especially where merging companies offer
improved products, what should constitute a "small but significant" increase in
price? Further, how long must the price increase remain in place to be
considered "nontransitory"?
3. Evaluating Mergers Using Nonprice Criteria
The work discussed in the previous Subsection suggests that price may be
an inappropriate indicator of monopolization in dynamic markets. The work
discussed in this Subsection considers research and development (R&D) efforts
as an alternative basis for evaluating mergers. It should be noted that this
proposal pertains to markets in which firms compete to bring breakthrough,
patentable products to market. Because there is no existing product market, it is
impossible to use price as a measure of competitiveness. Further, the concept of
"innovation markets" is in tension with the error-cost or judicial-competency
critiques of antitrust enforcement in dynamic markets. Under an error-cost
view, it generally makes sense to postpone or forgo enforcement until the
relevant market (i.e., price) data can be gathered.8 Under an "innovation
markets" approach, by contrast, enforcement authorities may challenge mergers
before a product even exists. This literature is somewhat less useful than the
papers already discussed to our overall project in that we are not generally
concerned with firms in the premarket stage. It is nevertheless worth
summarizing for two reasons. First, because many firms in dynamic markets
have both market-ready products and R&D investments, it might add to the
toolbox used to consider mergers in at least some kinds of dynamic markets.
Second, and more importantly, it recognizes that some firms compete on
nonprice factors and shows that it might be possible to evaluate mergers
without relying wholly on price signals or falling back on the vague "practical
indicia" of Brown Shoe: there might be a replacement for R&D as an indicator
for innovative efforts in the business model context.
The FTC and the Justice Department introduced the idea of an
"innovation market" in 1995 when they issued the Antitrust Guidelines for the
80. Id.atIll.
81. Manne and Wright, for instance, argue that there should be a "per se" rule of legality for
new product introductions; further, only consummated mergers should be subject to challenge, and only
then when enough time has passed to allow generation of market data relevant to the alleged
anticompetitive effects. Manne & Wright, supra note 6, at 197-98.
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Licensing of Intellectual Property.82 An innovation market, according to the
agencies, "consists of the research and development directed to particular new
or improved goods or processes, and the close substitutes for that research and
development."83 The theory behind policing innovation markets under the
antitrust laws is that, when there are few firms in the market, mergers between
firms engaging in similar R&D might provide an incentive to suppress research
paths. Antitrust enforcement agencies following this approach would consider
not just whether a merger would allow a hypothetical monopolist to raise prices
in an existing product market, but also whether it would allow the hypothetical
monopolist to restrict the development of new products. The difficulty of
measuring such an effect could be mitigated by equating innovation with R&D
expenditures. Thus, a merger would be enjoined if a hypothetical monopolist
would restrict R&D efforts in the relevant market-mirroring the SSNIP
analysis, "a small but significant and nontransitory" reduction in R&D effort.84
In a 1995 case, for example, the FTC entered into a consent decree with two
merging companies that were both at a relatively advanced stage in developing
noninjectable migraine-treatment drugs. The agency's main rationale for the
enforcement action was that the merger would both decrease the number of
R&D tracks and make it easier for the companies to reduce R&D on the
remaining track. 86
Although innovation markets have not featured widely in the cases
brought by the enforcement agencies, 8 7 they have sparked debate among
commentators. Critics argue that the innovation-R&D conflation is a
problematic oversimplification: concentration of firms conducting R&D does
not necessarily lead to less R&D, and restricted R&D funding does not
necessarily result in less innovation." Moreover, focusing on R&D restricts the
agencies' consideration of dynamic effects to firms or industries engaging in
identifiable R&D efforts. 89
82. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FTC, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Apr. 9, 1995), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf.
83. Id. 3.2.3, at 11.
84. See, e.g., Gilbert & Sunshine, supra note 6, at 573 (arguing that innovation "warrants a
more central role in antitrust analysis").
85. MICHAEL A. CARRIER, INNOVATION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: HARNESSING THE POWER OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW 314-15 (2009) (citing In re Glaxo PLC, 119 F.T.C.
815, 815-16 (1995)).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 297, 312-13 (noting that, as of 2009, there had been ten challenges to mergers in
innovation markets, all of which were resolved by consent orders).
88. See, e.g., Richard T. Rapp, The Misapplication of the Innovation Market Approach to
Merger Analysis, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 19, 20 (1995) (discussing problems with the innovation markets
approach to merger analysis).
89. CARRIER, supra note 85, at 298-99 (acknowledging that it can be difficult to identify the
relevant firms in an innovation market, but arguing that the objection does not apply to the




E. Revising the Horizontal Merger Guidelines
The previous Section provided an overview of the commentary criticizing
existing merger doctrine as ill-suited to dynamic markets. This Section
provides an overview of statements made by legal and business stakeholders in
the regulatory process. An overview of the public comments submitted to the
FTC during its revision of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines suggests there is a
growing sense in the legal community that the agencies ought to take better
account of dynamic competition.
The FTC solicited input from the public at two main stages during its
review of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines. It initially posed a set of targeted
questions regarding potential revisions in 2009 and subsequently issued a draft
version of the new guidelines for public comment in April 2010. One of the
points on which the agency sought advice in 2009 was whether the new
Guidelines should "address more explicitly . . . the effects of mergers on
innovation." 90 Prominently, both the American Bar Association (ABA)
Antitrust Section and the American Antitrust Institute 91 recommended a more
explicit treatment of dynamic considerations in merger analysis. 92 Several of
the comments filed in response to the draft Guidelines issued in April 201093
expressed further concern that the agency was not taking sufficient account of
dynamic competition concerns. Most notable were the submissions by the
ABA; 9 4  the joint submission by Verizon, the Biotechnology Industry
90. FTC & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES: QUESTIONS FOR
PUBLIC COMMENT 5 (Sept. 23, 2009), available at http://www.itc.gov/bc/workshops/hmg/hmg-
questions.pdf.
91. The American Antitrust Institute is a Washington think tank that describes itself as a
"counterweight to conservative influence" that is "dedicated to supporting a more aggressive antitrust
agenda." About Us, AM. ANTITRUST INST., http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/content/about-us (last
visited Apr. 3, 2012).
92. # 319; Project No. P092900; Horizontal Merger Guidelines Review Project: A Series of
Five Joint FTC-DOJ Workshops: Public Comments, FTC, http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/
horizontalmergerguides/index.shtm (last visited Apr. 3, 2012). The American Antitrust Institute
suggested that the agencies should consider "reasoned predictions of how a market is expected to evolve
within specified timeframes. Such predictions could rest on internal planning documents of industry
participants, consensus of industry experts, or other methodologies determined to have significant
forecasting value." Am. Antitrust Inst., Fed. Trade Comm'n File No. 548050-00025, Pub. Comment No.
P092900, Horizontal Merger Guidelines Review Project, FTC & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE 10 (Nov. 9,
2009), available at http://www.fic.gov/os/comments/horizontalmergerguides/545095-00023.pdf Both
the Institute and the ABA cited United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974), as an
example of predictive factor analysis. Am. Antitrust Inst., supra, at 10; Am. Bar Ass'n Section of
Antitrust Law, Fed. Trade Comm'n File No. 545095-0010, Pub. Comment No. P092900, Horizontal
Merger Guidelines Review Project, FTC & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE 19 (Nov. 6, 2009), available at
http://www.fic.gov/os/comments/horizontalmergerguides/545095-00010.pdf.
93. FTC & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES FOR PUBLIC COMMENT
(Apr. 20, 2010) [hereinafter DRAFT GUIDELINES], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/04/
100420hmg.pdf.
94. Am. Bar Ass'n Section of Antitrust Law, Fed. Trade Comm'n File No. P092900, Pub.
Comment No. 548050-00026, Horizontal Merger Guidelines Review Project, FTC & U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE (June 4, 2010) [hereinafter ABA Submission], available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/hmgrevisedguides/548050-00026.html.
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Organization, the Financial Services Roundtable, Microsoft, the National
Association of Manufacturers, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
("Verizon");95 and a companion paper to Verizon submitted by Professor
Dennis W. Carlton at the University of Chicago ("Carlton").9 6 We will briefly
discuss the main concerns expressed in these submissions.
ABA, Verizon, and Carlton all objected to the draft Guidelines' alleged
overemphasis on preserving short-term price efficiencies, arguing it could
provide the wrong incentives to firms operating in dynamic markets. Verizon
acknowledged that the draft Guidelines provided "an important step in the right
direction" by (1) allowing enforcement agencies to "consider the effects of
cognizable efficiencies with no short-term, direct effect on prices in the
relevant market" and (2) acknowledging that fixed-cost efficiencies "can
benefit customers in the longer run, e.g., if they make new product introduction
less expensive." 97 Yet according to Verizon, this positive step fell short. The
Guidelines inappropriately continued both to accord "the most weight to" short-
term efficiency benefits and to privilege efficiencies that prevent price
increases over those that promote innovation.98 ABA argued similarly that the
agencies should focus not only on making new product introduction "less
expensive" but also on making it "more likely."99
All three comments also objected to the agencies' chosen methods of
measuring competition-in particular their emphasis on "unilateral effects."
The draft Guidelines defined "unilateral effects" as the "elimination of
competition between two firms that results from their merger [and that] may
alone constitute a substantial lessening of competition."' 00 Where merging
firms A and T produce differentiated products that function as substitutes, the
acquiring firm can profit from raising the price of product A because it captures
the shift in demand to product T. According to the draft Guidelines, the
enforcement agencies will seek to determine the "upward pricing pressure"
(UPP) on product A by calculating the firm's "diversion ratio": the fraction of
unit sales lost by product A that would be diverted to product T.101 Carlton
95. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., Biotechnology Indus. Org., Fin. Servs. Roundtable, Microsoft
Corp., Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. & U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Fed. Trade Comm'n File No. P092900, Pub.
Comment No. 548050-00022, Horizontal Merger Guidelines Review Project, FTC & U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE (June 4, 2010) [hereinafter Verizon Submission], available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/hmgrevisedguides/548050-00022.pdf
96. Dennis W. Carlton, Comment No. 548050-00034, Fed. Trade Comm'n File No. P090900,
Horizontal Merger Guidelines Review Project, FTC & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE (June 4, 2010)
[hereinafter Carlton Submission], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/
hmgrevisedguides/548050-00034.pdf.
97. Verizon Submission, supra note 95, at 4 (citing DRAFT GUIDELINES, supra note 93, § 10
n.12).
98. Id.
99. ABA Submission, supra note 94, at 25. This line of argument is closely related to literature
on "innovation markets."





noted that a potential problem with using UPP is its implicit assumption that all
firms correspond to a static Bertrand pricing model, where firms
simultaneously set prices taking one another's as fixed.102 Yet in an industry
where several firms are competing to introduce new products (i.e., are
competing on performance rather than price), a merger that lowers the cost of
innovating may be pro-competitive even though the diversion ratio is high.103
Thus, using UPP will tend not only to produce false positives' 04 but also to
discount the potential for competing innovative firms to reposition themselves
in the market. 05
The Guidelines changed little between the April 2010 draft and the final
version, which was issued in August 2010, after the comment period. The
appearance of a few minor changes suggests that the agencies paid limited heed
to the commentators' concerns. The current version of the Guidelines, which
retains UPP analysis as the central methodology for measuring the competitive
effects of a merger, adds an aside that "[f]urther analysis is required to account
for repositioning, entry, and efficiencies.,,106 The 2010 Guidelines thus
demonstrate a peripheral recognition that the current doctrine is insufficient to
assess an important class of merger cases. Yet the enforcement agencies as yet
provide no indication of how they might take dynamic considerations into
account.
It is worth pointing out that the comments did not provide much in the
way of policy solutions, either. ABA's suggestions appeared in general terms:
the agencies should "tak[e] into account" repositioning or nonprice
efficiencies.' Carlton's recommendations were only slightly less generalized:
first, enforcement agencies should avoid presuming a lack of competition in
industries with high levels of R&D, associated high fixed costs, low marginal
costs, and high short-run gross margins; and, second, they should avoid
enjoining mergers that reduce fixed costs, thus enhancing firms' incentives to
invest in R&D. 08
The main point here is that there is a shared conception among both
academics and practitioners that something other than the conventional tests is
needed to evaluate mergers in dynamic markets. Most of the literature has
focused so far on high-technology or research-heavy markets. In the next two
Parts, we argue that business model innovation brings many of the same
economic benefits as dynamic product competition (Part III); and antitrust law
102. Carlton Submission, supra note 96, $ 30-32, at 14-15.
103. Id.132,atl5.
104. Verizon Submission, supra note 95, at 2.
105. Id.; accord ABA Submission, supra note 94, at 14-16.
106. 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 6.1.
107. ABA Submission, supra note 94, at 14.
108. See Carlton Submission, supra note 96, at 10.
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is ill-suited for policing mergers in markets where business model innovation is
prominent (Part IV).
III. Dynamic Competition Theory and Business Model Innovation
Rapid business model innovation is most likely to take place where there
are broad shifts in consumer preferences. In such markets, it can be difficult to
define the relevant market because it is not clear which products should be
viewed as potential substitutes. In addition, it can be difficult to tell whether a
projected postmerger price increase would constitute an abuse of market power
or, rather, a desirable "premium" for competitive innovation: if dynamic
conditions are likely to persist, a postmerger price increase is likely to be
transitory even though a SSNIP analysis in the apparently relevant product
market at the time of the merger might suggest otherwise.
A. Business Megatrends and Innovation Premiums
In the case of a "paradigm shift," a firm's ability to increase prices after a
merger may not be the best indicator of competition in that market. 10 9 A
paradigm shift need not be technologically oriented: indeed, technological
innovation is only one of a number of market conditions that may change how
companies compete. "[F]inancial crises, shifts in the social realities that define
the marketplace, or the threat of conflict over resources" present new and
"inescapable strategic imperatives for corporate leaders" that in turn provide
new sources of value.' 10 As more and more firms revise their business models
to respond to the new conditions, they participate in what David Lubin and
Daniel Esty have called a business "megatrend." 11 Firms that respond best to
the values driving a megatrend capture a "premium" for successful business
model innovation,112 and it is the prospect of such a premium that fuels
innovation.
Lubin and Esty provide several examples of historical megatrends. In the
"quality revolution" of the 1970s, firms like Honda and Motorola redesigned
manufacturing and product development processes to "reduce risks of product
failures, functional inadequacies, and other inefficiencies."" 3 Similarly, the
1980s and 1990s saw a revolution in the development and application of
information technology as firms responded to the 1982 recession by using
109. See supra text accompanying note 80.
110. David A. Lubin & Daniel C. Esty, The Sustainability Imperative: Lessons for Leaders
from Previous Game-Changing Megatrends, HARV. Bus. REv., May 2010, at 43, 44.
111. Id. This process can be described as "performance competition." See Pleatsikas & Teece,
supra note 75, at I11.
112. Lubin & Esty, supra note I 10, at 46.




"emerging information technology innovations to drive cost savings." 14
American Airlines's electronic reservation system is a "classic" example.' 15
Growing consumer concern with environmental or "green" values is a
contemporary example. Lubin and Esty argue that this shift is so pronounced
that it creates a "sustainability imperative"" 6 : many businesses have found they
must incorporate sustainability concerns into their business models in order to
remain competitive. Successful innovators who reposition themselves in the
marketplace capture an "eco-premium."" Widespread attempts to obtain such
a benefit produce a "sustainability megatrend."ls
Whole Foods founder John Mackey told the New York Times Magazine in
2004, "Whole Foods benefits from the fact that our culture, and especially our
food culture, is shifting profoundly.""19 The company has been able to
capitalize on both the willingness of a "sizable portion" of consumers to pay
more for organic food and broad changes in American eating habits and family
composition: Americans today cook less, shop more often, and buy more
prepared foods, while families consist increasingly of single parents and fewer
children.120 Whole Foods's successful capitalization on this profound shift in
market conditions might be viewed as an eco-premium.
B. The Difficulty of Identifying Substitutes for Business Models in Dynamic
Markets
Capturing the available premium in the case of a paradigm shift or
business megatrend requires successful business model innovation through
identifying and responding to a particular set of unsatisfied consumer
preferences. Firms operating in a dynamic market assemble preferences in
different iterations and respond to the resulting bundles in different ways. As in
the case of complex technologies,121 there are difficult-to-quantify tradeoffs
among potential business model substitutes. Judges considering mergers
between dynamically competitive companies may therefore have a difficult
114. Id. at 46.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 46, 48. Lubin and Esty provide several examples of firms that have successfully
captured an eco-premium. See id. at 47 (discussing General Electric's "Ecomagination" initiative).
118. Id. at 48.
119. Jon Gertner, The Virtue in $6 Heirloom Tomatoes, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 6, 2004,
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/06/magazine/the-virtue-in-6-heirloom-tomatoes.html.
120. Id.; see also U.S. Census Bureau Reports Men and Women Wait Longer To Marry, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU (Nov. 10, 2010), http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/
families households/cb 10-1 74.html (reporting that average household size and the percentage of two-
parent households declined from 2000 to 2010).
121. See Pleatsikas & Teece, supra note 75, at 108 ("With high-technology products,
substitution analysis becomes much more difficult."); supra text accompanying note 77.
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time defining the relevant market, and consequently in estimating postmerger
market shares or unilateral effects.' 22
In order to define a market, judges must first determine which products
are potential substitutes.1 2 3 That inquiry is difficult where demand elasticities
are inherently unpredictable, as in dynamic markets: different consumers may
be more or less likely to substitute as new firms offering different business
model variations enter the market or existing firms reposition themselves in
response to changing conditions.
In the high-technology context:
The ability of customers to utilize specific high-technology products in their businesses is
often based on whether that product satisfies arcane technical and economic criteria. Because
data relevant to quantifying economic substitutability are incomplete or not available at all, it
may be difficult to determine or even to estimate, with an acceptable degree of accuracy, the
proportion of users who can avail themselves of existing substitution possibilities.1
2 4
"Arcane technical and economic criteria" is simply one way to describe a
set of consumer preferences that is difficult for judges to identify. Having
limited technical knowledge is functionally the same as having a limited
understanding of how a particular combination of characteristics might stack up
against other combinations for consumers of the particular bundle in question.
The question of whether a conventional grocery store is a substitute for a
PNOS illustrates the problem for business models. Consumers might make
decisions about where to grocery-shop based on a number of considerations,
including the prices of different goods, the store ambiance or overall shopping
"experience," and the firms' commitment to environmental values. Where
supermarkets are responding to different combinations of values in different
ways, it will be particularly difficult for courts to determine which bundles are
substitutes for which consumers.
The district and appellate courts in Whole Foods disagreed over whether
conventional supermarkets with organic food aisles were competitors for
Whole Foods and Wild Oats. The district court emphasized the repositioning of
several supermarkets "to compete vigorously with Whole Foods and Wild Oats
for the consumers' premium natural and organic food business" in refusing to
grant an injunction. 12 5 The D.C. Circuit, by contrast, discounted repositioning
of stores that did not emphasize customer service, provide a "unique
environment," and focus on the "core values" of "health and ecological
sustainability."' 26
122. 2 VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., supra note 1, § 30.03 ("Concentration, with its companion
concept of market share, is still the most significant factor in assessing anticompetitive effects.").
123. 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 4.1.1.
124. Pleatsikas & Teece, supra note 75, at 108.
125. FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 2d 1, 48 (D.D.C. 2007).




The Guidelines suggest that the enforcement authorities will err against
viewing products as substitutes in the face of uncertainty: "Although excluding
more distant substitutes from the market inevitably understates their
competitive significance to some degree, doing so often provides a more
accurate indicator of the competitive effects of the merger than would the
alternative of including them and overstating their competitive significance as
proportional to their shares in an expanded market." 127 Where uncertainty is
trenchant, as in the case of rapid business model innovation, a conservative
approach may cause the analysis to be error-prone. This is especially true
where the market is undergoing a transformation. It may take time to see
whether a new business model provides a substitute. Market data about an
organic food aisle gathered directly after its opening, for instance, may counsel
against treating it as a substitute; whereas better data gathered a year later
might show that it in fact provides competition for the Whole Foods down the
street. 128
IV. Advancing Innovation Through Mergers
The previous Parts have demonstrated that antitrust law is often ill-
equipped to deal with the complexity and dynamism of business model
innovators. What has yet to be explained, though, is why mergers like the one
that occurred in Whole Foods deserve special attention. Why is it not enough to
tolerate the single-player markets that arise naturally from business model
innovation while still allowing the government to regulate the artificial
concentration of market power through mergers? After all, the acquisition of
market share by companies like Whole Foods is the byproduct of their
innovation, not the cause of it. What about mergers among business model
innovators meaningfully advances innovation?
In this Part, we provide the answers to those questions. We first discuss
how dynamic market mergers create incentives for market entry that increase
competition on the macro, if not the micro, level. The next Section then
explains how mergers in dynamic markets create special synergies with unique
value beyond the usual efficiencies associated with mergers. We then contrast
business model innovation with technological innovation and argue that the
general unavailability of patents for business model innovation provides
support for laxer antitrust enforcement. Finally, we explore the asymmetries
that result when antitrust regulators treat business model innovations as distinct
submarkets.
127. 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 4.0.
128. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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A. Competitive Incentives
On the surface, mergers appear to reduce competition. A merger by
definition reduces the number of competitors in a market and concentrates
greater market power in fewer hands. This market power in turn produces
restrained production, higher prices, lost consumer welfare, and greater
potential for collusion among remaining competitors.129 But while the results of
mergers may diminish competition in a given market, the ongoing possibility of
future mergers can also have effects that are decidedly pro-innovation and pro-
competition. This Section explores the ways in which robust merger activity
enhances both.
Of the various ways in which businesses compete, the use of mergers is
among the best for fostering innovation in dynamic markets. Indeed, the very
fact that the Federal Trade Commission Act regulates mergers through its
prohibition on "unfair methods of competition,,13 0 acknowledges that, if
nothing else, merger is a form of competition. True, the result of a merger is a
single business where once there were two; but quite frequently that second
business might not have existed but for the possibility of acquisition by a larger
competitor. The next two Subsections explore how the potential for M&A
induces entry into dynamic markets and how, compared with other mechanisms
for competition, mergers and acquisitions are more favorable to innovation.
1. Mergers and Acquisitions as an Exit Strategy in Dynamic Industries
Entrepreneurship frequently depends on the existence of viable exit
strategies; and nowhere is this fact more evident than in innovative sectors of
the economy.131 New startup companies require the investment of considerable
time, labor, and financial resources, and if entrepreneurs feel that they will be
unable to extricate themselves from the businesses they start, they may hesitate
in taking the initial plunge. Though these risks may not deter committed
entrepreneurs from exerting the energy necessary to establish a new business,
even true believers require startup capital to finance their nascent companies.
129. See 1 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 327 (6th ed.
2007).
130. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).
131. In 2011, merger activity volume in North America was highest among industrials and
chemicals; technology; business services; and pharmaceuticals, medical, and biotechnology-all sectors
that place a premium on technological or service innovation. Meanwhile, merger activity was lowest
among the comparatively less innovative agriculture and real estate sectors. See Monthly M&A Insider:
A Mergermarket Report on Global M&A Activity, MERGERMARKET GRP. 15 (Dec. 22, 2011), available
at http://www.mergeriarket.com/PDF/MMAIDecember_1 l.pdf At the same time, traditional
innovators have been active in acquiring other firms. For example, Google executed thirty-nine
transactions between 2009 and the first halfof 2011, and Microsoft paid over $9 billion to acquire Skype
Technologies SA. See Half Year Mergers and Acquisitions Trends Report: Online & Mobile Industry,





Acquiring this capital in turn requires the participation of venture capitalists
and other financiers, entities even less likely to tolerate the risk of starting a
new business without a viable exit strategy.
Initial public offerings (IPOs) have traditionally provided a mechanism
through which entrepreneurs and their financial backers can continue to reap
economic rewards while washing their hands of the continued risk and hard
work required in running a business. In addition to the prestige and notoriety
associated with going public, an IPO creates liquidity for the owners of the
company's securities, allowing them to more freely sell their shares in a public
market.132 As a result, when markets are strong, pre-IPO owners can utilize the
IPO as a means of selling their stake in the company at a healthy premium.
Unfortunately, IPOs have limited usefulness as exit strategies. The cost of
going public can be extravagant:
[L]egal fees can range from $150,000 to $450,000 depending on the size and complexity of
the deal, accounting fees can range from $100,000 to $250,000, printing costs for the various
registration documents can range from $75,000 to $175,000; and the underwriters will
typically receive a cash commission of five to ten percent of the aggregate proceeds of the
initial public offering. In an initial public offering in the $10 million to $50 million range, the
total fees excluding the underwriter's commission range from $400,000 to $1 million.
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Also discouraging are the oftentimes onerous registration and reporting
requirements that companies must satisfy during and after the IPO process.134
And, when market conditions are unfavorable (such as during a recession),
finding an underwriter may be impracticable regardless of the soundness of a
company's business model.13 5 So although the iPO is an essential means of
enabling exit, its economic feasibility frequently depends on exogenous factors.
Mergers and acquisitions, along with IPOs, provide the chief exit strategy
of entrepreneurs and investors in startup companies.136 Because IPOs are so
often economically unviable, pursuit of an acquisition offer is often the only
way in which a company's founders can avoid running and expanding the
company indefinitely. But when excessive regulation of mergers and
acquisitions in dynamic markets limits this exit option, it hampers the
132. See Richard A. Mann et al., Starting from Scratch: A Lawyer's Guide To Representing a
Start-Up Company, 56 ARK. L. REV. 773, 840 (2004).
133. Jd. at 841-42.
134. See id. ("Once public, the SEC requires the issuer to make annual, quarterly, and
continuous reports of all material events. Although these reports may not be as detailed as the
registration requirement for an initial public offering, the reports require the assistance of attorneys,
accountants, and public relations professionals. Also, potential liability is connected with these
disclosure requirements, placing a burden on public companies that is difficult to quantify. Finally,
public companies are inherently transparent: regular fillings and required public disclosures result in a
significant loss of a company's confidentiality." (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
135. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 120 (4th ed. 2002).
136. See Arleen Jacobius, Managers Get "No Exit" Sign, PENSIONS & INV. (Aug. 22, 2005),
http://www.pionline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20050822/PRINTSUB/508220728/103 1/TOC.
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willingness of entrepreneurs to found new businesses, both in terms of quantity
and quality.
As to quantity, many businesses would not (and likely do not) exist at all
in the absence of acquisition as a viable exit strategy. While all entrepreneurs
and startup investors value flexibility, this is "especially true for serial
entrepreneurs who want to move on to their next venture." 37 The case is even
stronger for innovative startup companies. Because the business models of
innovators are (by definition) untried, they will often be perceived as riskier (at
least from an ex ante perspective), and the importance of a viable exit option is
all the more important in compensating for the increased risk. But that exit
option becomes decreasingly viable in the shadow of an antitrust regime that
stymies mergers and acquisitions or, as was the case of the Whole Foods-Wild
Oats merger, imposes costly delays and regulatory hurdles. Consequently,
fewer and fewer innovative business models will find startup capital or the
entrepreneurs willing to apply the elbow grease necessary to turn their visions
into reality.
By erecting barriers to exit, intrusive antitrust regulation of mergers
reduces not only the quantity of innovative business models, but also the
quality. It does this in at least two ways: first, by influencing the kind of people
who choose to create innovative business models; and, second, by artificially
altering the form of the startup business.
"Serial entrepreneurs," as described above, are unusually sensitive to exit
strategy viability. Because the participation of serial entrepreneurs in dynamic
markets is particularly valuable, that sensitivity is cause for concern.m An
entrepreneur who has started a company that went public is statistically more
likely to succeed in subsequent ventures than a first-timer.139 Unlike other
entrepreneurs with more singular visions, serial entrepreneurs often use the
proceeds from selling one business to develop another, which suggests that
their net impact on the economy and business innovation is likely greater.140
Developing novel business ideas is the primary talent of the serial entrepreneur.
By focusing on this comparative advantage, the serial entrepreneur more
137. See SERGIO D. YBANEZ, GROWTH STRATEGIES: How SOFTWARE START-UPS CAN
LEVERAGE ALLIANCES, ACQUISITIONS, IPOS AND VENTURE CAPITAL 131 tbl.5 (2007).
138. That sensitivity is also necessary, given the composition of the labor market for
entrepreneurs. See Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Serial Entrepreneurs and Small Business
Bankruptcies, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2310, 2312 (2005) ("The owner-operator's human capital is not tied
to any particular business enterprise; it can be redeployed when opportunities outside the existing
enterprise are more attractive than those inside, which is precisely why most entrepreneurs are serial
entrepreneurs.").
139. See Paul Gompers et al., Skill vs. Luck in Entrepreneurship and Venture Capital:
Evidence from Serial Entrepreneurs 2-3 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12,592,
2006), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl2592.
140. See Steve Taplin, Serial Entrepreneurship: An In-Depth Look at the Phenomenon of





efficiently divides labor with those more adept in management.141 Finally,
serial entrepreneurs, by their very nature, are more likely to have experience
starting companies, allowing them quicker, defter navigation of the creative
process. 142 At least one study, for example, has found that the success of novice
entrepreneurs often depends on whether they receive support from top-tier
venture capital firms, while serial entrepreneurs show consistent performance
regardless of the source of their venture capital financing.143 Because a robust
acquisition-exit option is necessary to attract serial entrepreneurs to risky but
innovative markets, antitrust enforcement can be especially inefficient when
applied to mergers in those markets.
Additionally, to the extent that the acquisition-exit option becomes less
available, startup companies looking for an alternative will artificially favor
IPOs. The effect is to perversely favor certain sorts of startups over others. For
example, successful IPOs typically require vast overhead and proven revenue
streams.144 Accordingly, IPOs are best tailored to companies that have
established records of success. Establishing such a record takes time, and the
longer the expected time horizon for a startup company's exit strategy to come
to fruition, the less willing investors will be to support risky yet innovative
businesses. Even when an innovative startup company's business model is not
economically viable over the long term (and therefore unfit for an IPO), it may
still possess productive and innovative features worth incorporating into
independently successful businesses. Again, a merger or acquisition allows for
this incorporation, but an IPO does not. In comparison with IPOs, mergers and
acquisitions often provide a better, more flexible exit strategy for innovative
startup companies. Consequently, when antitrust laws are overenforced against
mergers, dynamic industries suffer most.
2. Comparing Mergers and Acquisitions with Alternate Forms of
Competition
An established business can choose among several options in dealing with
an upstart competitor. One option is merging with or acquiring the competitor.
Generally speaking, this course of action benefits the target competitor
financially, while still protecting the interests of the acquirer, whose status in
the market is preserved.14 5 But although the merging companies may benefit,
the same cannot always be said of third parties who are not privy to the merger,
141. Cf Kirk Taylor, What Is a Serial Entrepreneur?, KIRK TAYLOR: ONLINE MARKETING
ENTREPRENEUR (Feb. 23, 2011), http://kirktaylor.com/what-is-a-serial-entrepreneur ("Many
entrepreneurs do not have the skills to manage large scale businesses, and by exiting and moving on,
they are able to create new opportunities focusing on skills that fit their talents.").
*142. See id.
143. See Gompers et al., supra note 139, at 1-2.
144. See YBANEZ, supra note 137, at 131.
145. Indeed, as will be shown, through incorporation of the innovative features of the target
company, the acquiring company actually enhances its competitiveness. See infra Section IV.B.
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such as consumers and additional competitors. Not surprisingly, this form of
competition is regarded suspiciously under antitrust law.
In most cases, the alternative to merging with or acquiring another
business is directly competing with that business. Ideally, that competition
results in a decrease in prices and an increase in the quality of the goods and
services provided, leading to consumer surplus. Unlike mergers and
acquisitions, antitrust law usually looks favorably on the fruits of competition
as generally beneficial. True, the potential acquirer and the potential target may
miss out on economic gains through the loss of the merger option, but these
losses are more than compensated for in gains to consumers and third-party
competitors in the market. In the abstract, it seems that direct competition is
preferable to market consolidation.
But this black-and-white static-model perspective oversimplifies markets.
Although the result of a merger may be a less competitive end-state, the merger
itself may serve competitive values. Consider an analogue: in the abstract,
antitrust law opposes monopolization because single-competitor markets can
reduce output while increasing price. But modern antitrust law allows for
monopolization so long as it occurs, not through anticompetitive conduct, but
rather as "a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic
accident."1 46 Otherwise, antitrust law would be self-defeating, sacrificing the
benefits of competitive markets in the name of competition. As Judge Learned
Hand famously quipped, "The successful competitor, having been urged to
compete, must not be turned upon when he wins."'47
Mergers and acquisitions can and do serve pro-competitive ends. 48 First,
unlike traditional forms of competition, such as aggressive advertising and
price-slashing, the prospect of acquisition can entice, rather than deter, entry
into the market by new competitors.149 Some academic literature argues, for
example, that Microsoft's market share and software bundling techniques,
rather than quashing the entry of new competitors into the market, actually
attracted competition. 50  Microsoft's well-known policy of purchasing
146. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966).
147. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945).
148. Along with promoting competition, mergers and acquisitions can enhance efficiency and
consumer welfare in other ways, such as the creation of economies of scale. See infra Section IV.B.
149. This argument is related to the exit strategy analysis provided above. See supra
Subsection IV.A.I.
150. See, e.g., RICHARD B. MCKENZIE, TRUST ON TRIAL: HOW THE MICROSOFT CASE IS
REFRAMING THE RULES OF COMPETITION 121-22 (2000) ("Given Microsoft's ability to market and
distribute software products, it is very likely that it can outbid many other existing competitors for
innovative products. As a consequence, Microsoft's market superiority could be an important spur to all
sorts of innovations . . . ."); David Croson & Adam Saunders, Competition and Cooperation in the
Bundled Software Market 1 (Dec. 12, 2004) (unpublished manuscript),
http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/wise2004/sun22l.pdf ("[T]he incentives for potential entrepreneurs to
innovate in the face of competing bundles are not, in fact, destroyed, but instead grow stronger as




competitors whose technological developments complemented its own
therefore encouraged potential entrepreneurs to enter the market while also
incorporating the entrants' innovations into Microsoft's own software
products.15 1  The result: gains to Microsoft, gains to the target startup
companies, and gains to consumers, who enjoy a superior product.
This final point bears emphasizing, since it demonstrates the special value
of mergers and acquisitions in innovative markets. Not only does the prospect
of an acquisition motivate entry into a market, thereby increasing competition,
but it also enhances the innovation present in that market. An industry leader
can crush an innovative competitor through direct competition or even deter it
from entering the market in the first place, but doing so prevents the potential
entrant from ever disseminating its innovations. Only truly inventive
entrepreneurs will find it worthwhile to enter markets dominated by an
established player, since only they offer innovations the dominant firm would
benefit from adopting. In contrast, market entrants unable to offer anything
unique "have little value and are discouraged" under this scenario.152
These insights have major implications for antitrust enforcement. In
dynamic markets that see constant innovation, whether in products, services, or
business models, the use of merger and acquisition by dominant players
encourages market entry and disseminates innovation. In these markets, courts
should enforce antitrust laws with a lighter hand, so as not to thwart beneficial
market activity. Conversely, acquisitions in more static markets are less likely
to create the same positive incentives and warrant more active enforcement of
antitrust regulations against market consolidation.
B. Merger Efficiencies in Dynamic Markets
In the modem era,' 53 inquiries into the permissibility of mergers generally
compare the harms resulting from the concentration of market power with the
greater operating efficiencies of the resulting entity.154 These operating
innovators who fear the software giant could simply duplicate potential products and sell them at lower
prices).
151. See id.
152. Id. at 4.
153. Historically, antitrust law has been inconsistent in its treatment of merger efficiencies.
See Robert M. Vernail, Comment, One Step Forward, One Step Back: How the Pass-On Requirement
for Efficiencies Benefits in FTC v. Staples Undermines the Revisions to the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines Efficiencies Section, 7 GEO. MASON L. REv. 133, 133 (1998) ("At different periods since the
advent of antitrust law, policy makers have disregarded efficiencies considerations, have considered
efficiencies against mergers, and have considered efficiencies in favor of mergers.").
154. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Merger Actions for Damages, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 937, 937
(1984) ("Mergers can have two different economic effects, one harmful to society and the other
beneficial. A merger may give the post-merger firm more market power than that enjoyed by either pre-
merger firm, encouraging reduced output and higher prices for consumers. For this reason, some
mergers are illegal under the antitrust laws. Yet a merger may also benefit society by increasing the
efficiency of the post-merger firm. Increased efficiency generally results in lower costs and lower
consumer prices.").
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efficiencies encompass a host of factors, including "economies of scale,
resource allocation, technological complementarities, specialization in product
line, reduction in transportation costs, and various kinds of transaction-cost
economies." 55 These benefits accrue not just to the postmerger firm, but also to
consumers, who often enjoy these efficiency gains in the form of lower costs
and higher-quality products.156 Admittedly, artificial factors, such as tax
avoidance, are often the driving force behind mergers; mature industries, for
example, may invest in more rapidly growing sectors to transform income into
capital gains, which are taxed at a lower rate. But at least such mergers are
not primarily motivated by the desire to consolidate market share.158
Balancing a merger's potential for anticompetitive effects with its
resulting efficiencies to the postmerger firm can often prove to be a difficult
inquiry.159 In the past, courts have scrutinized mergers for disparities between a
postmerger firm's profit-maximizing price and its marginal cost of production.
But, as argued by Professor Herbert Hovenkamp, a higher profit rate is the
natural result of many successful business decisions, whether mergers, patented
discoveries, or other innovations. Instead, he argues, courts should explore
"whether the postmerger firm has the power profitably to restrict output to
below the pre-merger level."1 60 While Hovenkamp's view is a step in the right
direction, we contend that when it comes to innovative markets, an examination
of short-term effects on output cannot be the sole determinant of the market
analysis. Rather, courts should scrutinize mergers between innovative firms in
light of a more dynamic model, one that accounts for the special long-term
efficiencies of such mergers as well as the competitive pressures that will
continue to exist.
155. Alan A. Fisher & Robert H. Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement, 71
CALIF. L. REv. 1580, 1599 (1983). Economies of scale may be the most-cited efficiency benefit of
merger, but it has been argued that this is actually among the weaker considerations in favor of market
consolidation, particularly in light of the fact that firms can replicate economies of scale through internal
expansion. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A New Approach to the Antitrust Analysis of Mergers, 83 B.U. L.
REv. 785, 825 (2003) ("Economies of scale should be ranked at the lower end of the efficiencies
analysis because they usually benefit producers more than consumers and can often be obtained through
internal growth, which is less restrictive of competition than a merger.").
156. See Pinar Karacan, Diferences in Merger Analysis Between the United States and the
European Union, Highlighted in Context of the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas and GE/Honeywell
Mergers, 17 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 209, 244 (2004); see also id. at 246 ("According to the Merger
Guidelines, mergers can generate significant efficiencies by permitting a better utilization of existing
assets. This enables the combined firm to achieve lower costs in producing a given quality and quantity
than either firm could have achieved without the proposed transaction."). As a point of comparison,
antitrust enforcement in the European Union accords merger efficiencies less weight, since an overriding
goal of European antitrust law is to level the playing field, not maximizing consumer welfare. See id. at
243-44.
157. See Fisher & Lande, supra note 155, at 1602-03.
158. See id.
159. See Hovenkamp, supra note 154, at 943.




1. The Special Efficiencies of Mergers in Innovative Sectors
In the classic case of a merger, one imagines two firms, each of which
produces widgets, joining forces to manufacture those widgets more efficiently:
perhaps collectively, the two firms can purchase the materials that go into
widget manufacturing in greater bulk in order to secure a discounted rate; the
resulting firm may eliminate duplicate costs by consolidating corporate
overhead or redundant facilities; or maybe the postmerger firm can divide
widget production at separate facilities so that each can specialize in
developing a unique kind of widget.161 The conventional narrative centers on
the tangible aspects of production: economies of scale, division of labor, lines
of production, etc. In more traditional sectors of the economy, such as
manufacturing, that story explains much of the value of mergers.
But in dynamic fields governed by constant innovation, the narrative loses
explanatory force. Perhaps most abstractly, mergers between innovative firms
can create synergies in human capital. Recent business trends have stressed the
"collaborative intelligence," or "CQ," that results from the cooperative work of
innovative thinkers.162 According to these theories, groups of innovators benefit
from greater problem-solving capabilities collectively than their constitutive
members exercise independently. To put the matter more simply, the whole is
greater than the sum of its parts (and by quite some measure). Indeed, many of
the most innovative firms today, such as Google, are considered to be the
foremost practitioners of collaborative intelligence, actively fostering collective
innovation in the development of their services.163 Antitrust scholarship already
161. See Piraino, supra note 155, at 823-24.
162. See generally STEPHEN JAMES JOYCE, TEACHING AN ANTHILL TO FETCH: DEVELOPING
COLLABORATIVE INTELLIGENCE @ WORK (2011) (highlighting the phenomenon of collaborative
intelligence and prescribing measures firms can take in order to foster greater CQ in their own
businesses).
163. See, e.g., Collaborative Intelligence: Google Exercising Its "CQ," GETTING CLEVER
TOGETHER, http://gettingclevertogether.com/collaborative-intelligence/collaborative-intelligence-
google-exercising-its-cq (last visited Apr. 3, 2012) (dubbing Google "arguably the most collaboratively
intelligent business on earth"); cf Ethan Lyon, Microsoft vs Google: Collaborative Intelligence in
Computing, SPARXOO (July 8, 2009), http://sparxoo.com/2009/07/08/microsoft-vs-google-collaborative-
intelligence-in-computing (lauding Google for tapping the collaborative intelligence of its "legions of
enthusiastic developer fans" in the development of its Chrome operating system). Other scholarship has
condemned Google for acquiring other firms, such as DoubleClick, that offer complementary innovative
products. See Kristine Laudadio Devine, Preserving Competition in Multi-Sided Innovative Markets:
How Do You Solve a Problem Like Google?, 10 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 59 (2008). Vertical integration, like
that described by Devine, raises issues separate from those addressed in this Article, but it does highlight
analogous concerns. One might fear the potential for such mergers to constrict possible avenues for
further innovation, as the resulting firm becomes committed to a single research path. See id. at 115;
Gilbert & Sunshine, supra note 6, at 595-97. The concern may be a legitimate one, but it is inherently
difficult to quantify against the countervailing benefits of collaborative synergies. At the very least, it
supports a more holistic, individuated analysis in the enforcement of antitrust law than currently exists.
See infra Part V. Moreover, the complementarity of two firms' innovation agendas may itself allow for
exactly the sorts of synergies described above; rather than jettisoning one avenue for innovation, the
post-merger firm could better coordinate multiple paths so as to maximize their integration and mutually
reinforcing effects.
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recognizes this phenomenon in the more limited context of combining the
research and development facilities of two tech firms.16 4 But the same logic
applies no less to innovation in business models, such as collaborating to
determine the proper store aesthetic for one's organic food markets. Bringing
together the most creative, insightful minds from two business model
innovators can foster serious returns to innovation.
In the field of antitrust, policymakers have already recognized the
synergistic benefits of collaboration between technological innovators. The
National Cooperative Research Act of 1984,165 which encourages joint research
and development by liberalizing antitrust enforcement against joint ventures,
provides evidence of Congress's "clear recognition of the priority to be
accorded innovative efficiency."l 6 6 Yet such legislation, while certainly
positive, repeats the error of the antitrust scholarship by equating innovation
with technological advancement. 16 7 No special protections exist to guard
business model innovation from overzealous antitrust enforcement, and the
FTC's decision to block the Whole Foods merger is evidence of this fact.
Collaborative intelligence is not the only human-capital synergy. Some
antitrust literature points to the creation of "management efficiencies," which
occur when two firms can choose among the best managers of both firms to
supervise the activities of the postmerger business.168 And because their
profitability often depends on the uniqueness of their business models, business
model innovators often jealously guard trade secrets and other proprietary
information. Sharing these business strategies and techniques can foster
synergistic growth, which allows the postmerger firm to draw from the best
practices of both its predecessors.
Although synergies in collaborative human capital and shared proprietary
information can result from any merger, these benefits apply most prominently
in the case of innovative industries, in which such features are a more vital
component of the business's success. Nonetheless, the comparative importance
of these merger efficiencies to dynamic industries versus traditional industries
is not merely an issue of degree, but also of kind. Efficiency gains among
business model innovators reduce the costs of production and enhance the
164. See Fisher & Lande, supra note 155, at 1600.
165. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305 (2006).
166. Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals ofAntitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and
Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020, 1026 (1987).
167. See, e.g., Felix Oberholzer-Gee & Dennis A. Yao, Antitrust-What Role for Strategic
Management Expertise?, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1457, 1466 (2010) (claiming that "despite a near-universal
belief that innovative efficiency is important, there have been very few enforcement actions in which
innovation markets played an important role" but restricting innovation to a purely technological
definition).




quality of the goods and services provided. 169 In evaluating mergers in
innovative sectors, then, courts must not only consider "[h]ow much of a
decrease in costs would compensate for an x percent increase in price," but also
factor in the fact that we "expect quality to increase by y percent (or to decrease
by z percent).",17 0 As Professors Alan Fisher and Robert Lande argue, this
multifactor calculus can pose an "enormously difficult" problem for those who
must apply the antitrust laws to sectors where the quality of products changes
constantly.17 ' But the status quo, which completely ignores how synergistic
mergers can enhance the quality of a firm's goods and services over time, is
clearly insufficient.
C. Business Innovation and Patent Law
Thus far, Part IV has mainly analyzed dynamic markets without
distinguishing between scientific innovation and business model innovation.
This conflation has been largely intentional, as both sorts of creativity add a
unique value for which antitrust law's static models frequently fail to
account.172 But key differences do exist between the two forms of innovation.
The foremost of these, and the subject of this Section, is the availability of
patents. While technological innovations (at least marketable ones) are
generally patentable so long as they are novel, nonobvious, and useful, 73 the
same is not true for so-called business method patents. This distinction is
crucial, as the inability to patent most business models increases the
competitive pressures rather than reducing them. Arguments for more
permissive antitrust regulation of scientifically innovative firms should
therefore apply afortiori to business model innovators.
This Section begins by presenting a brief summary of the current state of
business method patent law, specifically in light of the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Bilski v. Kappos.174 After that, we note some of the public benefits
arising from unpatentable business innovations. Finally, we contend that
because patents are typically unavailable for business models, permitting some
169. Cf Brodley, supra note 166, at 1026 ("Of the three types of efficiencies, innovation
efficiency provides the greatest enhancement of social wealth, followed by production efficiency, with
allocative efficiency-the main focus of current enforcement efforts-ranking last.").
170. Fisher & Lande, supra note 155, at 1634; see also id. ("One of the most important
qualifications to Williamson's model is that merger efficiencies can affect product quality as well as
costs. Once we recognize the possibility of quality changes, the tradeoff analysis must maximize welfare
over three rather than two parameters, thereby vastly increasing the complexity of the analysis.").
171. See id. at 1634-35.
172. For a thorough analysis of how merger policy frequently fails to account for
technological innovation, see Michael L. Katz & Howard A. Shelanski, Mergers and Innovation, 74
ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (2007).
173. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements cf this title.").
174. 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
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consolidation of market power may be essential in order to adequately motivate
business model innovation.
1. Business Method Patents After Bilski
The line between patentable and unpatentable ideas has long been a hazy
one. Before Bilski, dicta in Supreme Court opinions suggested that patents only
extended to machines and processes that involved "[t]ransformation and
reduction of an article 'to a different state or thing."'"75 The Federal Circuit
took the Supreme Court at its word and established the "machine-or-
transformation" test,176 which amounted to a per se rule for determining
whether a subject matter was appropriate for patenting. The result was that
business method patents, such as the method for hedging risk in commodity
sales at issue in Bilski,17 7 were presumptively invalid. The Federal Circuit's
decision sought to curtail an intellectual property regime run amok, as the U.S.
Patent Office commonly granted patents to processes that strained the
rationales for intellectual property protection, such as patents for jury selection
methods,178 methods for selling merchandise on a golf course,179 and methods
for playing poker. 180
The Federal Circuit's new test did not survive for long. Instead, the
Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit's formalistic rule (as it commonly
does ) as merely "a useful and important clue" and adopted a more holistic
standard.182 Concluding that section 100(b) of the Patent Act did not require the
harsh strictures of the machine-or-transformation test, the majority left the door
open for business method patents. It simultaneously reiterated, however, that an
"abstract idea," such as the hedging technique at issue, remains unpatentable.18 3
Lower courts and businesses may be left wondering what business
methods are patentable post-Bilski. That said, inchoate concepts like the PNOS
model certainly fall outside the realm of patentability, even under the
permissive regime that existed prior to Bilski. Individual aspects of PNOSs-
like the organization of store shelves, techniques for selecting inventory, and
175. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972) (quoting Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S.
780, 788 (1876)); see also Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 n.9 (1978) ("An argument can be made
[that the Supreme] Court has only recognized a process as within the statutory definition when it either
was tied to a particular apparatus or operated to change materials to a 'different state or thing."').
176. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
177. See id. at 949.
178. Sys. and Methods for Making Jury Selection Determinations, U.S. Patent No. 6,607,389
(filed Dec. 3, 2001).
179. Method of Selling Merch. on a Golf Course, U.S. Patent No. 6,457,317 (filed Jan. 22,
2001).
180. Card Game & Method of Playing Card Game, U.S. Patent No. 6,070,873 (filed Mar. 12,
1998).
181. See, e.g., Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2,45 (2010).
182. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010).




methods for enhancing the customer experience-might arguably be akin to the
"Method of Selling Merchandise on a Golf Course" variety of patents, but such
patents are no longer acceptable under the current system. Nor does there exist
any evidence that organic markets like Whole Foods would have sought to
patent certain aspects of the PNOS model if given the opportunity. It is
therefore probably safe to conclude that federal intellectual property law does
not encompass innovations in business models.
2. The Benefits of Unpatentable Business Models
Intellectual property law does not extend patent protection to innovation
in business models. But what implications can be drawn from this fact?
First, when compared with industries whose innovations center around
patentable ideas, markets involving business model innovation should be
comparatively more competitive. A patent grants its owner a state-endorsed
monopoly over a certain product for a specific term. While the temporary
monopoly granted by the patent is considered essential to creating incentives to
innovate,184 it entails the usual costs associated with monopolies, such as
diminished production and higher prices for consumers.' 85 In fact, the legal
enforceability of these monopolies means that the costs they impose are
particularly severe. Under ordinary circumstances, dominant firms are
chastened by the specter of competition from newcomers who might one day
enter the market. But when the government provides the monopoly, it erects an
absolute barrier against market entry, thereby nullifying these mitigating
factors. Indeed, scholars have for decades critiqued this seeming inconsistency
of antitrust law and patent law.186
When businesses like Whole Foods innovate, however, no such barrier to
entry exists. Competitors-both present and future-are free to replicate the
PNOS model wholesale or to cherry-pick its most worthwhile features. In fact,
the form of market power the FTC accused Whole Foods of wielding is
theoretically the least dangerous of all, since the only barrier to entry is the
willingness of existing competitors to adapt their business model to a new
megatrend. This adaptation presumably involves transaction costs. But given
that PNOSs innovate from a traditional business model, the transaction costs
required for regular supermarkets to replicate all or part of the model are
relatively small. Contrast that form of market power with more dangerous
forms of monopoly, such as government-sponsored monopolies or private firms
that exercise exclusive control of a single resource. In these cases, real
184. See, e.g., 1 JAY DRATLER, JR. & STEPHEN M. MCJOHN, LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY § 502[2], at 5-35 (2011).
185. See, e.g., STEPHEN A. MERRILL, RICHARD C. LEVIN & MARK B. MYERS, A PATENT
SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTuRY 39 (2004).
186. See Donald F. Turner, Patents, Antitrust, andInnovation, 28 U. PITT. L. REV. 151 (1966).
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anticompetitive barriers to entry exist because of either the threat of legal
sanctions or the physical scarcity of some resource.'
Dominance of the PNOS market is benign even in comparison with other
cases of market power in industries with low barriers to entry. For example, if
Microsoft decided to enter the fast food business, it would probably possess the
resources necessary to do so. But unless Microsoft intended to compete only on
a very basic level, the upfront costs would be extraordinary: real estate space,
staff, advertising, management, strategy costs, etc. Those costs, even if
surmountable, might still deter Microsoft from competing (and, indeed, they
presumably do). A monopolist in the fast food industry might hesitate to
exercise its market power for fear that abusive conduct will induce entry from
new competitors, but the deterrence value of potential entry is partly mitigated
by the monopolist's knowledge of these obstacles to starting a new business. A
monopoly in the fast food industry can still threaten consumer surplus. But if
Safeway decided, for example, to adopt the PNOS model, it could alter current
stores and reallocate existing capital to successfully compete with organic food
markets. These transitions would not be costless, but replication of the PNOS
model would prove far easier than entry into a completely unrelated industry.
The general unavailability of patents for business model innovation also
creates positive feedback loops for innovation by competing firms. Obviously,
one firm's patent on a certain innovation precludes competitors from using that
same innovation. To the extent that the patented idea is actually useful, the
existence of the patent limits the extent to which the public can utilize its
value. Retail pioneer Walmart has managed to innovate its way to becoming
the largest corporation in the world yet holds only seventy-five patents and
patent applications.189 Meanwhile, Walmart's innovations-one-stop shopping,
rejection of high-low pricing, etc. 190-have been widely imitated by an array of
competitors. At the same time, Walmart is itself a notorious imitator of its
competitors' best practices; in an effort to attract higher-income customers, the
retail giant has experimented with the PNOS model by expanding organic food
offerings, among other changes. 191
187. See N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 316-18 (3d ed. 2004).
Mankiw also mentions natural monopolies as an instance where serious barriers to entry exist. However,
natural monopolies are a special case, as they arise (at least theoretically) in situations in which it is
more efficient for a single firm to exist rather than multiple firms.
188. See Turner, supra note 186, at 152.
189. See U.S. Patents and U.S. Patent Applications by walmart, FREE PATENTS ONLINE,
http://www.freepatentsonline.com/search.html (select "US Patents" and "US Patent Applications"; then
search "AN/'wal mart'; then follow "Search" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 3, 2012); see also TED Book
Maps a New Age of Creativity and Invention, supra note 4 (remarking that "most innovations in most
industries are not patented").
190. See CHARLES FISHMAN, THE WAL-MART EFFECT: HOW THE WORLD'S MOST POWERFUL
COMPANY REALLY WORKS-AND How IT'S TRANSFORMING THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 61 (2006); see
also supra text accompanying notes 2-4 (discussing Walmart's retail innovations).





The ramifications for innovation extend beyond direct application. Most
problematic, patents may undermine innovations that build upon existing
dynamic business models:
The holding of a broad patent by one firm in some cases deters other firms from trying
themselves to invent "in the neighborhood." In particular, unless that patent is liberally
licensed, other firms are deterred from themselves undertaking any of the wide variety of
follow-on inventive work that improves, or variegates, on an initial invention.1
92
But unpatentable business model innovations allow not only replications,
but improvement as well. The PNOS model may tap into a megatrend in a way
previous business models failed to achieve, but that in no way guarantees that it
has done so optimally. Protecting the competitive viability of innovative
business models not only enhances the amount of existing innovation; it also
provides the foundation for future developments that perfect the innovation.
3. Market Consolidation as Incentive for Innovation
The previous Subsection focused on the negative aspects of patents. We
argued that the unavailability of patents for business model innovations means
that market power in such industries neither threatens competition nor excludes
competitors from adopting and enhancing such innovations. But patents exist
for a reason. The costs of the state-imposed monopoly-reduced output and
higher prices-are necessary, it is argued, to properly incentivize innovations
that would otherwise prove to be economically unviable. Thus, the importance
of patents is at its peak in an industry like the pharmaceutical business, where
fixed research and development costs are extremely high but the marginal cost
of producing individual drugs is very low. 9 3 Without patent protection as a
form of "reward" for an individual firm's hard work, the fear that competitors
would sell generic versions at rock-bottom prices would deter pharmaceutical
companies from ever investing in research to begin with.
While we do not argue that the rationale for patents is strong enough to
justify intellectual property protection for innovative business models, it does
provide a useful reference point when enforcing antitrust law. Broadly
speaking, patent law acknowledges that anticompetitive harms may be justified
when they constitute a necessary prerequisite to innovation. The same logic
may apply to businesses like Whole Foods. If Whole Foods realizes that
government regulators will never allow it to reap the rewards of market
dominance, it has less incentive to innovate and compete than it otherwise
192. Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, The Benefits and Costs of Strong Patent
Protection: A Contribution to the Current Debate, 27 RES. POL'Y 273, 275 (1998) (citations omitted); cf
Turner, supra note 186, at 152 ("[T]he patent system often forces competitors of the patent holders to
invest resources in duplicating research, that is, to find other non-infringing ways of obtaining the same
or nearly the same result.").
193. See Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 192, at 275-76.
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would. Indeed, if one's business model innovations may themselves define a
new market for the purposes of antitrust regulation, then businesses may be
deterred from innovating in the first place for fear of being pegged as wielding
market power in these dynamic markets.1 9 4 Much like a system in which
patents are granted parsimoniously, rigorous enforcement of antitrust law may
have pro-competitive effects at the cost of valuable innovation.
Throughout Part IV, we have generally argued that mergers of innovative
firms in dynamic markets either (a) pose few threats to competition or (b)
themselves enhance innovation and other efficiencies. But even if both (a) and
(b) are empirically false, strict antitrust enforcement against mergers of
innovative firms may still be imprudent policy. Lax antitrust regulation, insofar
as it enables firms to reap the rewards of their innovations, may be essential
simply as a mechanism for incentivizing socially optimal amounts of
innovation. The goals of advancing competition and enhancing innovation may
sometimes come into conflict, and a government that ignores the latter in
pursuit of the former conducts a myopic economic policy.
D. The Competitive Asymmetries of the Status Quo
By permitting the FTC to define the PNOS model as a market distinct
from traditional supermarkets, the Whole Foods case created an asymmetry
between innovation at the firm level and innovation within a firm. According to
the FTC's view, if Ralph's or Safeway adds an organic food section to its
traditional grocery stores, it still competes with other standard supermarkets for
the purpose of antitrust analysis. But when PNOSs like Whole Foods and Wild
Oats focus primarily on the sale of organic food products, the FTC treats them
as occupying a distinct market. The efforts of traditional grocery stores to
corner the organic food market are therefore considered in light of competition
in the larger supermarket industry, while PNOSs must survive antitrust scrutiny
as players in a smaller submarket. The result is an antitrust regime that
arbitrarily favors incremental innovation within the context of existing markets
rather than the creation of innovative submarkets. This Section explores the
harms of favoring business model innovation within established, traditional
firms. 195
194. Cf FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ("[Sluccess
tum[s] on whether there exist core customers, committed to PNOS, for whom one should consider
PNOS a relevant market.").
195. It is important to keep in mind that the perverse incentives discussed in this Section
operate on the margins. While asymmetric enforcement of antitrust law will have effects on the quality
and quantity of innovation, we make no empirical claim as to the size of such effects. Rather, we simply




1. Harms to Innovation
Whole Foods suggests that innovation occurring in a distinct submarket is
subject to an antitrust inquiry separate from that applicable to innovation
occurring within an existing market. At first glance, this may appear to weaken
the argument of the Article. After all, if innovation will occur either way, what
does it matter if it happens within existing traditional-model firms rather than
firms whose entire business model is committed to a specific innovation? The
fact of innovation does not change, merely its location.
But the source of innovation may itself be relevant to the quality and
quantity of innovation that takes place. Asymmetrically preferring innovation
occurring within a traditional-model firm may stifle creative developments in at
least two ways. First, the organization of large, established corporations 96is
less conducive to business model innovation than that of companies that
compete solely in dynamic submarkets. Long-existing businesses, particularly
those operating under the traditional model, often face the threat of stagnation
in their corporate cultures. The causes are myriad: aging personnel who become
set in their ways; the establishment of a "rigid organizational structure" and an
"increase [in] the number of rules over time" ;197 and the general susceptibility
of corporate strategy to inertia.' 98 Such companies are less amenable to major
changes to their business models and become more reactive than proactive.
Admittedly, even an innovative-model business like Whole Foods may
eventually become susceptible to corporate culture stagnation. But if antitrust
law holds such businesses to a higher standard, then fewer "vitalized" startups
will be willing to enter dynamic submarkets to take their place.
Even if, as a matter of corporate culture, a traditional-model business is
receptive to change, structural hurdles in the organization may thwart
innovation. Established firms become hampered by over-bureaucratization, the
result of the incremental accumulation of rules that, though initially the
formalization of best practices, eventually emphasize the process over
results. 199 Bureaucratization, in turn, obstructs firm-wide innovation, thereby
limiting the extent to which a traditional firm can transform its business model.
Second, traditional firms have fewer incentives to focus their energies on
continued business model innovation. In a traditional supermarket, the organic
foods section is one component of the overall business model. While the
196. Admittedly, the size of some competitors in a dynamic submarket may be greater than
that of many firms in the larger traditional market. However, given that one group of firms is defined as
the dynamic submarket of the other, it is reasonable to assume (a) that dynamic market competitors are,
by and large, younger than their traditional counterparts; and (b) that since traditional-market
competitors have, on average, been around longer, they have had more time in which to attain greater
size.
197. TOYOHIRO KONO & STEWART R. CLEGG, TRANSFORMATIONS OF CORPORATE CULTURE:
EXPERIENCES OF JAPANESE ENTERPRISES 20 (1998).
198. Id. at 21.
199. See id.
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supermarket has a vested stake in the sale of its natural and organic food
products, it composes only a portion of its total inventory, so the success of the
firm as a whole is not dependent on the success of its more innovative
components. For PNOSs, business in natural and organic foods is more than a
single investment in the broader portfolio; that business is the portfolio. With
its rise or fall utterly dependent on its success in tapping into a megatrend, a
PNOS must focus all of its energies in a single, innovative business model.
Additionally, because megatrends are more susceptible to changes in consumer
preferences than more traditional markets, firms competing in dynamic markets
must not only sustain their original creative business model, but also evolve it
to keep up with shifts in the megatrend. Traditional-model firms can still tap
into megatrends, but unlike innovative-model firms, their survival is not
dependent on doing so. They therefore lack the same incentives and structural
capabilities that allow for optimal innovation.
2. Harms to Innovators
Asymmetric antitrust enforcement also has at least two ramifications for
human capital: first, there is less financial incentive for creative people to
engage in business model innovation in the first place; and second, those who
still seek to innovate have an artificially greater incentive to do so within
established traditional-model firms. The losses to innovation resulting from the
first consequence are fairly obvious, and we have already discussed them in
some detail.200 This Subsection focuses on the harms that occur when
innovators are artificially induced to work within traditional corporate
structures rather than participating in dynamic markets.
First, for reasons related to the previous Subsection, innovators working
within traditional-model businesses are less likely to have a voice in the upper
rungs of the corporate hierarchy. When a firm's past success has been
predicated on a certain business model, its management may be hesitant to
adopt risky innovations that depart from conventional behavior. 201The
innovations developed by creative individuals may also "disrupt," rather than
"sustain," the existing business model in a way that appears threatening.
Although a firm may enhance its long-run competitiveness by adapting to the
disruptive model, in the short term, such innovations might undermine existing
revenue streams.202 (For example, imagine a supermarket that consistently
profited from its junk food section suddenly shifting focus to the health benefits
of its new natural and organic foods.) Because there will be fewer situations in
which the firm will adopt their recommendations for business model
200. See supra Subsection IV.A.1.
201. See KONO & CLEGG, supra note 198, at 19.
202. Cf CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR'S DILEMMA, at xi-xxxi (1998)




transformation, innovators will have comparatively fewer opportunities for
advancement within the firm. Even a traditional-model firm that makes
conscious efforts to reward its inventive employees will be hard pressed to
compete with business model innovators in promoting such workers to upper-
level management. Creative employees should disproportionately constitute the
management of business model innovators, if for no other reason than that the
establishment and initial expansion of such firms rests on their talents.
Second, there exist concerns of fairness. Current antitrust law establishes
incentives that relegate innovators to secondary roles within firms. At the same
time, innumerable sources list innovation as the most important of all the
203
factors that make for a successful business in the modem economy. A system
that discourages innovators from taking a central role is more than just
inefficient; it is arguably perverse.
3. Political Harms
Asymmetric application of antitrust law has political, as well as economic,
ramifications. By favoring traditional-model firms, the status quo advantages
incumbent market participants, who are often larger than the newer firms that
inhabit dynamic markets. 204 But larger, more established firms-both because
of their economic heft and their age-are more likely to possess political clout
that they can leverage to their own advantage. That dynamic, in turn, can create
problems, as "every industry or occupation that has enough political power to
utilize the state will seek to control entry." 205 Under this account, powerful
business interests will attempt to "capture" political apparatuses (such as
administrative agencies) in order to use their regulatory powers for their own
ends. Examples include the imposition of tariffs on competing foreign goods,
licensing requirements for new market entrants, or even regulatory burdens that
favor larger corporations with the economies of scale to satisfy these
206
requirements.
The irony is that antitrust measures intended to increase competition may
ultimately have unintended anticompetitive effects. Asymmetric antitrust
regulation of business model innovators may not necessarily consolidate
market power, but it does facilitate the consolidation of political power.
203. See generally FRANCES HORIBE, CREATING THE INNOVATION CULTURE: LEVERAGING
VISIONARIES, DISSENTERS AND OTHER USEFUL TROUBLEMAKERS IN YOUR ORGANIZATION (2001)
(reporting consensus on this issue among BusinessWeek, Harvard Business Review, Fortune, and
various CEOs of major corporations).
204. See supra note 196.
205. George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY:
READINGS IN THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF AMERICAN PUBLIC POLICY 67, 69 (Thomas Ferguson &
Joel Rogers eds., 1984).
206. See id. at 69-70.
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V. Recommendations for Reform
This Article has argued that modem antitrust law fails to account properly
for dynamic markets and business model innovation. In particular, the FTC's
application of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines in cases such as FTC v. Whole
Foods Market, Inc. considers short-term cost efficiencies without properly
evaluating the returns to innovation that occur from allowing mergers. This Part
offers some recommendations for reform to the Guidelines.
The history of American antitrust law has been a largely inexorable march
from strict per se rules to a more permissive standards-based approach under
207the rule of reason. Some argue that adjudication by standards allows judges,
govemment agencies, and other fact-finders wide discretion that may require
them to "ramble through the wilds of economic theory in order to maintain a
flexible approach." 2 08 At the same time, the uniqueness of antitrust law's
"treble damages remedy, the close proximity of socially beneficial and harmful
behavior, and the propensity of competitors to misuse antitrust lawsuits for
strategic advantage" all favor a more moderate approach that evaluates an array
of factors. 209 This counsel is especially salient for enforcing antitrust law in
dynamic markets, where precise quantification of the benefits of innovation
may prove difficult.210
We therefore believe that a standards-based approach is particularly
appropriate in regulating mergers between business model innovators. In that
light, we propose that the Horizontal Merger Guidelines be revised to allow for
a more holistic consideration of the costs and benefits of a given merger. The
FTC's evaluation should be governed not by any per se test, but by a set of
qualitative and quantitative criteria. Specific measures such as SSNIP, while
easy to administer, are also arbitrary, limited, and subject to manipulation. The
obvious weakness of a standards-based approach is uncertainty in enforcement.
Though this is a reasonable concern in the abstract, factual disagreements arise
207. See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 49, 60 (2007) ("The transition from rules to standards did not take place solely due to a
juridical shift of particular business practices from one category to another. Instead, the entire judicial
rhetoric of antitrust has moved in a more nuanced, standard-based direction over the past few decades.
With few exceptions, the courts have stopped creating new categories of per se illegal conduct . . . ."
(footnote omitted)). See generally Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: From
Hedgehog to Fox in Forty Years, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 49 (2010) (tracing the evolution of the Horizontal
Merger Guidelines from a set of harsh, immutable rules to standards for fact-specific inquiry).
208. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609-10 n.10 (1972).
209. See Crane, supra note 207, at 54.
210. See, e.g., Katz & Shelanski, supra note 172, 77-78 (arguing that, where technological
innovation from research and development is at stake, a "case-by-case, fact-intensive inquir[y]" is




even when applying supposedly objective rules;21 and, in any case, uncertain
standards are still better than bad rules.
An appropriate set of Horizontal Mergers Guidelines would make the
following changes:
* Determine whether the merging firms are members of a dynamic
market of business model innovators. When the FTC determines that,
because of the lack of substitute goods for certain products, those products
occupy their own market, it should inquire into whether this market is
truly distinct or merely a dynamic submarket of a larger static-model
market. Factors should include the length of time the products have been
generally available for purchase by the public, whether the market as a
whole has seen significant size increases in recent years, and whether the
products are similar in function to those of other markets but simply differ
in quality. Given the cost of false positives, 2 12 this inquiry should be
especially flexible in order to allow a finding that the merging firms
possess uniquely innovative business models.
* Evaluate nontransitory increases in price more flexibly. The threat that
market power allows price increases is still an important consideration in
the administration of antitrust law and the protection of consumer welfare.
Currently, the SSNIP test looks to price increases in order to determine
whether "a product market contain[s] enough substitute products so that it
could be subject to postmerger exercise of market power significantly
exceeding that existing absent the merger."213 The Guidelines should
nevertheless be revised to reject the SSNIP test's bright-line approach of a
five-percent price increase.214 Such a rule-based approach creates an
unjustified presumption of anticompetitive behavior, even if that
presumption is not intended to be dispositive. Instead, SSNIP analysis
should be conducted, an estimate for the short but significant increase in
price should be calculated, and this entire analysis should count as one
factor among many for the ultimate determination. Indeed, critics have
already challenged the five-percent bright-line approach in the context of
high-technology markets, where quality-adjusted prices may drop twenty
percent annually.215
* Once merging firms are determined to be business model innovators,
presume, ceteris paribus, that the merger is reasonable.
211. See, e.g., FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(discussing disagreement between the two sides' expert witnesses concerning proper application of
SSNIP to the Whole Foods Merger).
212. See supra Subsection II.C.I.
213. 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 4.1.1.
214. See Whole Foods, 548 F.3d at 1052 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
215. See Katz & Shelanski, supra note 172, at 35.
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* Place the burden on the FTC to show that alleged merger efficiencies
will not occur for mergers between business model innovators. While
section 10 of the Guidelines allows consideration of gains to efficiency
that result from mergers, the FTC "credit[s] only those efficiencies likely
to be accomplished with the proposed merger and unlikely to be
accomplished in the absence of either the proposed merger or another
means having comparable anticompetitive effects." 216 As a result, the
merging firms bear the burden of demonstrating to the FTC's satisfaction
that unique efficiencies can result only via merger and that these
efficiency gains are not "vague, speculative" or unverifiable.217 Because
the precise results of any given merger are unpredictable, particularly
when it comes to dynamic markets, section 10 places a major hurdle in the
way of businesses that wish to merge. For instance, the FTC typically
seeks "tangible evidence of the likelihood of entry," which is notoriously
difficult to provide.218 Instead of applying "skepticism" to proposed
mergers, the FTC should only challenge mergers when the alleged
efficiency gains have no sound basis in fact or are contrary to existing
evidence.
These suggestions for Guidelines reform are by no means meant to be
exhaustive. But they are a starting point for a discussion about how federal
antitrust enforcement can better account for the uniqueness of innovative
business models in dynamic markets.
Conclusion
This Article advances two main ideas. First, technological advancement is
not the only (or even chief) means through which firms innovate, and
consumers readily benefit from a company's innovative business model. As it
is currently constructed, antitrust law does not adequately appreciate the market
dynamics of dynamic markets. Second, regulators should not fear mergers
between business model innovators. By tapping a host of efficiencies not
necessarily available to more traditional firms, such mergers are likely to be
pro-competitive.
We believe that the Horizontal Merger Guidelines should be revised to
accommodate those observations, but they need not depart wholesale from the
existing approach. While antitrust enforcers should continue to scrutinize price
216. 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 10.
217. Id.
218. Katz & Shelanski, supra note 172, at 44. Katz and Shelanski argue that "[i]nvestments in
R&D, as well as in specialized plant and equipment, may strongly indicate that the firms will shortly be
entering the product market and, hence, that a merger analysis based on current market shares would
overstate likely future concentration." Id. at 44-45. But that solution is only available to technologically





increases when evaluating a merger, they should also analyze whether the
relevant market is dynamic and thus requires less stringent policing of the
merger. Certainly this inquiry will be difficult and subject to error. We believe
this supplement to the Guidelines will at least ensure that judges and regulators
are cognizant of the problem, and will provide decisionmakers an opportunity
to develop a competency for evaluating competition involving innovative
business models.
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